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Flores: A Disability is Not a Trump Card: The Americans with Disabilities

A DISABILITY IS NOT A TRUMP CARD:1 THE
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT DOES
NOT ENTITLE DISABLED EMPLOYEES TO
AUTOMATIC REASSIGNMENT
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine that Jane has twenty years of experience in a particular field
and applies for a job that requires five years of experience in the same
field.2 Despite being well-qualified, Jane is not selected for the position.
To her dismay, Jane learns that the job was offered to someone else who
was significantly less-qualified than Jane and who possessed only five
years of experience in the requisite field. Sufficiently puzzled, Jane then
learns that although the selected individual was substantially lessqualified than she for the role, the individual was chosen because he had
a disability. Bewildered, Jane contacts an employment attorney for
advice. The attorney explains that Jane may have no legal recourse in
disputing the employer’s decision because some courts have held that an
employer is required to hire the disabled, but less-qualified, employee
under certain circumstances.3
Brief Amici Curiae of the Equal Employment Advisory Council and the Employers
Group in Support of Petitioner, i, 5 US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391 (2002) (No. 001250) (arguing that the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”) “stops short of
providing a [‘]trump card[’] guaranteeing a preference in job placement to an employee
with a disability”).
2
This fictional hypothetical scenario was created by the author to illustrate the
potential impact of the so-called mandatory reassignment provision of the ADA.
3
See, e.g., US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 393–94 (2002). In Barnett, the Court
held that if a qualified, disabled employee, who is unable to perform his existing job, shows
“special circumstances[,]” an employer may be required to overlook its established seniority
policy and reassign the disabled employee to a particular vacant position for which another
employee has greater seniority and is otherwise entitled. Id. at 394. The Barnett Court,
thus, raised the question of the scope of an employer’s duty pursuant to the ADA in
providing reasonable accommodation to disabled employees. Id. By indicating that an
employer must give preference to a disabled employee, even when doing so violates the
company’s established seniority policy, the Court, at least inferentially, suggested that an
employer may also be required to override other established hiring policies in favor of
reassigning a qualified, disabled employee, including a policy of hiring the most-qualified
candidate for a position. Id. at 397. Moreover, in his dissenting opinion, Justice Scalia more
directly raised the question as to whether the majority’s reasoning applies to an employee’s
reassignment request that violates the employer’s qualification-based hiring policy. Id. at
416 (Scalia, Thomas, J.J., dissenting). See also infra notes 52–66 and accompanying text
(discussing Barnett); infra note 75 and accompanying text (discussing Smith v. Midland
Brake).
See also Carlos A. Ball, Preferential Treatment and Reasonable Accommodation Under the
Americans with Disabilities Act, 55 ALA. L. REV. 951, 952 (2004) (citing Barnett, 535 U.S. at
397). “The Court in Barnett for the first time explicitly ruled that the ADA often requires
1
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The above example sets the stage for a hotly contested issue that has
received much attention in the past decade: whether Title I of the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”) entitles a disabled
employee, who is unable to perform his existing job, to be reassigned by
his employer to a vacant position for which he is qualified, even though
another candidate is more-qualified for that vacant position.4
It is undisputed that Title I of the ADA protects qualified individuals
with disabilities from discrimination in employment.5 The reach of its
mandate, however, is far from clear.6 Is a qualified, disabled employee
entitled to a vacant position for which another candidate is morequalified merely because he is disabled?7 The ADA does not answer this
specific question.8 Furthermore, the enforcement guidelines issued by
that employers provide their disabled employees with preferential treatment.” Id. The
Barnett opinion gives disability rights advocates the “best vehicle” for making the case that
affording preferential treatment when reassigning disabled employees to vacant positions
is necessary in order to achieve equality among disabled employees and is, therefore,
required. Id. at 990, 988–95. Ball contended that Barnett called into question the holding in
EEOC v. Humiston-Keeling, in which the Seventh Circuit decided that the ADA is not a
mandatory preference statute and does not require employers to violate their hiring
policies when reassigning disabled employees to vacant positions. Id. (citing EEOC v.
Humiston-Keeling, Inc., 227 F.3d 1024, 1027–29 (7th Cir. 2000)). Ball also argued that, based
on Barnett, and in line with the Tenth Circuit’s holding in Midland Brake, an employer is
required to afford preferential treatment when reassigning a qualified, disabled employee,
even if, in doing so, the employer has to waive his typical hiring policy and reject a morequalified candidate. Id. (citing Barnett, 535 U.S. at 397; Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180
F.3d 1154, 1167–68 (10th Cir. 1999) (en banc)).
4
See Stephen F. Befort & Holly Lindquist Thomas, The ADA In Turmoil: Judicial
Dissonance, The Supreme Court’s Response, and the Future of Disability Discrimination Law, 78
OR. L. REV. 27 (1999) (noting that whether the ADA entitles an employee, who is disabled
and unable to perform his assigned job, to be automatically reassigned to a vacant position
over a more-qualified person has been debated since the ADA’s infancy); infra notes 74–75
(discussing Huber v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., Humiston-Keeling, Burns v. Coca-Cola Enters.,
Midland Brake, Barnett, and EEOC’s Enforcement Guidance).
5
42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1)–(2) (2000) (stating that the purpose of the ADA is to
“eliminat[e] . . . discrimination against individuals with disabilities[]” and to
“provide . . . enforceable standards [for] addressing [such] discrimination”); see also
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 Statement by the President of the United States,
1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 601 (1990 WL 285753) (indicating that the aim of the ADA is to prohibit
discrimination against disabled persons).
6
See, e.g., infra notes 44–46, 49, 52, 54–56, 74–75, 82–83, 85–86, 88, 95–96 and
accompanying text (discussing the many judicial opinions which have interpreted
ambiguous terms and provisions within the ADA).
7
See infra notes 74–75 and accompanying text (discussing relevant cases and EEOC
enforcement guidance).
8
See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (2000). The provision addressing reassignment as reasonable
accommodation does not delineate whether an employer is required to reassign an
employee who becomes disabled. Id. Section 12111(9) is known as the reasonable
accommodation provision.
Id.
The phrase contained within Section 12111(9)(B),
mentioning reassignment, is known as the reassignment provision. Id. § 12111(9)(B)
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the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) state that
reassignment is required in such a situation, and although these
guidelines do not carry the force of law, they certainly cloud an
employer’s reassignment obligation.9 Additionally, United States Circuit
(mentioning “reassignment to a vacant position[]” as a possible form of reasonable
accommodation); see also infra note 42 (quoting the ADA’s reasonable accommodation
provision and the reassignment provision therein). See generally Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–213 (2000); 47 U.S.C. § 225 (2000). The ADA
does not specifically state whether an employer must reassign a qualified, disabled
employee to a vacant position when the same employee is unable to perform his assigned
job. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–213 (2000); 47 U.S.C. § 225 (2000).
9
See 42 U.S.C. § 12116 (2000) (explicitly requiring the EEOC to issue regulations to
enforce Title I of the ADA). See also EEOC Interpretive Guidance, 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630. The
EEOC regulations include a lengthy appendix, containing guidance for interpreting Title I
of the ADA. Id. Appendix to Part 1630, which does not carry the force of law, provides:
Reassignment to a vacant position is also listed as a potential
reasonable accommodation. In general, reassignment should be
considered only when accommodation within the individual’s current
position would pose an undue hardship. Reassignment is not
available to applicants. An applicant for a position must be qualified
for, and be able to perform the essential functions of, the position
sought with or without reasonable accommodation.
Id. pt. 1630.2(o), App. See also EEOC Enforcement Guidance: Reasonable Accommodation
and Undue Hardship Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, EEOC Compliance
Manual (2002), available at http://eeoc.gov/policy/docs/accommodation.html. The EEOC
Enforcement Guidance, presented primarily in question and answer format, states as
follows:
The ADA specifically lists “reassignment to a vacant position” as a
form of reasonable accommodation.
This type of reasonable
accommodation must be provided to an employee who, because of a
disability can no longer perform the essential functions of his/her
current position, with or without reasonable accommodation, unless
the employer can show that it would be an undue hardship.
An employee must be “qualified” for the new position. An employee
is “qualified” for a position if s/he: (1) satisfies the requisite skill,
experience, education, and other job-related requirements of the
position, and (2) can perform the essential functions of the new
position, with or without reasonable accommodation. The employee
does not need to be the best qualified individual for the position in order to
obtain it as a reassignment.
Id. at 18–19 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). Additionally, question 29 states, “Does
reassignment mean that the employee is permitted to compete for a vacant position? No.
Reassignment means that the employee gets the vacant position if s/he is qualified for it.”
Id. at 21. See also US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 414 (2002) (Scalia, J., filed a
dissenting opinion, in which Thomas, J., joined) (citing to the then-current EEOC
Enforcement Guidance: Reasonable Accommodation and Undue Hardship Under the
Americans with Disabilities Act, 3 BNA EEOC Compliance Manual, No. 246, p. N:2479
(Mar. 1, 1999)) (acknowledging that the majority opinion relies on the EEOC’s enforcement
guidelines to support its view that, in certain circumstances, an employer should give
preference to a disabled employee when reassigning that employee to a vacant position,
and arguing the alternative view—that the same guidelines do not place such a
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Courts of Appeals have disagreed and developed varying interpretations
of an employer’s reassignment duty.10 Nonetheless, despite these
conflicting positions, the United States Supreme Court backed away
from a prime opportunity to address this precise question in 2002.11 As a
result, courts have continued to deliver differing opinions regarding
whether an employer is required to reassign a qualified, disabled
employee, who is unable to perform his assigned job, to a vacant position
when a more-qualified candidate is available.12
In December 2007, the Court granted certiorari in Huber v. Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc., a controversy involving this precise issue.13 Commentators
predicted that the Court would decide the case on its merits, thereby
finally resolving the tension among the circuits.14 However, the parties
settled outside of court before oral arguments were scheduled, and
accordingly, the Court dismissed the case.15 Thus, the circuit split still
exists concerning whether an employer is required to reassign a
qualified, disabled employee over a more-qualified candidate.16
The purpose of this Note is to propose the correct analysis which
leads to finding that the ADA does not require an employer to reassign
to a vacant position a qualified, disabled employee who is unable to
perform the essential functions of his existing job.17 When an employee
requirement on employers).
10
See infra note 74 and accompanying text (discussing judicial interpretation of the
ADA’s reassignment requirement in the Seventh and Eighth Circuits); infra note 75 and
accompanying text (discussing judicial interpretation of the ADA’s reassignment
requirement in the Tenth Circuit).
11
See Stephen F. Befort, Reasonable Accommodation and Reassignment Under the Americans
With Disabilities Act: Answers, Questions and Suggested Solutions After US Airways, Inc. v.
Barnett, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 931, 984 (2003) (acknowledging that the Supreme Court “passed
on a golden opportunity in Barnett to resolve . . . significant issues[]” relating to the
reassignment provision of the ADA).
12
See, e.g., Huber v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 486 F.3d 480 (8th Cir. 2007) (acknowledging
the circuit split, the court rejected the Tenth Circuit’s view and agreed with the Seventh
Circuit, holding that an employer is not required to reassign a qualified, disabled
employee, who is unable to perform her current job, to a vacant position in violation of its
legitimate, qualification-based hiring policy), cert. granted, 76 USLW 3200 (U.S. Dec. 7, 2007)
(No. 07–480), cert. dismissed, 2008 WL 114946 (U.S. Jan 14, 2008) (NO. 07–480, R46–008).
13
See id.
14
See infra note 98 (noting that commentators predicted that the Court would be able to
decide Huber on its merits, rule in Wal-Mart’s favor, and resolve the circuit split).
15
See infra note 98 (indicating that the Court dismissed Huber after the parties settled
outside of the court system).
16
See infra note 98 and accompanying text (indicating that the Court granted certiorari in
Huber).
17
See infra Part IV.A (presenting model judicial reasoning for concluding that the ADA’s
reassignment provision does not mandate that an employer reassign a qualified, disabled
employee, who is unable to perform the essential functions of his current position, over a
more-qualified candidate).
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becomes disabled and unable to perform his job, an employer may
consider reassigning him to a vacant position, but is not required to
reassign him over a better-qualified candidate.18 Thus, the appropriate
outcome in the hypothetical scenario presented above is that the
employer may reassign the disabled, but less-qualified, employee to fill
the vacant position, but is free to hire Jane—the external candidate
possessing fifteen more years of experience than the minimally qualified,
disabled employee.19
First, Part II of this Note discusses how the United States Supreme
Court and Circuit Courts of Appeals have interpreted the ADA’s
ambiguous provisions and presents the circuit split concerning whether
an employer is required to reassign a qualified, disabled employee to a
vacant position, where a more-qualified, non-disabled person would be
his first choice.20 Second, Part III describes the problems with the Tenth
Circuit’s approach of interpreting the reassignment provision as
mandating reassignment in such a situation.21 Finally, Part IV proposes
See infra Part III (elaborating on why the ADA does not require an employer to
reassign a qualified, disabled employee, who is unable to adequately perform his job, to a
vacant position over a more-qualified candidate).
19
See infra Part III (analyzing why requiring an employer to choose the less-qualified,
but disabled, employee conflicts with the ADA’s requirements); infra Part IV (suggesting
that a well-reasoned approach to interpreting the reassignment provision allows an
employer to fill a vacant job based on merit and without regard to disability).
20
See infra Part II.A (explaining why the ADA was enacted); infra Part II.B (reviewing
how courts have interpreted the ADA); infra Part II.C (discussing the existing circuit split
concerning whether an employer is required to automatically reassign a qualified, disabled
employee to a vacant position). See also, e.g., infra note 36 (summarizing the protection
provided by the ADA). While this Note focuses primarily on the portions of the ADA
pertaining to Title I’s employment provisions, other statutory areas are discussed to
provide a general overview of the ADA’s broad-based protections. See, e.g., infra notes 45–
46 (discussing Supreme Court opinions interpreting the ADA). A sampling of cases
touching various areas of the private sector are included to show that the ADA has
substantially impacted many areas in the private sector. See, e.g., infra note 45 (discussing
PGA Tour, Inc., decided in the context of Title III dealing with public accommodations, in
which the Court determined that a requested accommodation was reasonable
accommodation pursuant to the ADA). Many judicial determinations have an effect in the
employment context, even though they were decided in the context of public
accommodations or telecommunications. See, e.g., infra note 45 (discussing Bragdon,
decided in the context of Title II, holding that Human Immunodeficiency Virus (“HIV”) is
an ADA-covered disability). When a court decides what constitutes a disability in a case
involving Titles II, III, or IV, its opinion and reasoning may be binding in an employment
dispute. See, e.g., infra note 45.
21
See infra Part III.A (analyzing the statutory text, and explaining how the Tenth
Circuit’s approach of mandating reassignment of a qualified, disabled employee, who is
unable to perform his assigned job, to a vacant position, over a more-qualified individual
goes beyond statutory requirements); infra Part III.B (examining the legislative history, and
showing how the Tenth Circuit’s approach to the ADA’s reassignment provision
contradicts congressional intent); infra Part III.C (reviewing the impracticality of the Tenth
18
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model judicial reasoning for determining that the ADA does not require
automatic reassignment.22
II. THE BACKGROUND OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT OF 1990
Prior to its enactment in 1990, the ADA received much support on
Capitol Hill.23 After all, the Act proposed to prohibit discrimination
against a class of “discrete and insular minorit[ies]”—people with
disabilities.24 Few people argued that the law was unnecessary in
eliminating unfair discrimination against the disabled.25 In fact, many
people recognized the ADA as a step in a positive direction for our
country.26 Thus, the well-intentioned, landmark legislation passed
Circuit’s approach to the ADA’s reassignment provision on employers and on nondisabled individuals).
22
See infra Part IV.A (proposing the correct rule and supporting reasoning for
concluding that the ADA’s reassignment provision does not require an employer to forego
its policy of hiring the most-qualified candidate in order to reassign a qualified, disabled
employee unable to perform his existing position); infra Part IV.B (discussing why Barnett’s
rebuttable presumption rule proposed in Part IV.A is the appropriate judicial approach to
deciding whether an employer is required to reassign a qualified, disabled employee—
unable to perform the essential functions of his job—to a vacant position over a morequalified candidate); infra Part V (summarizing the need for greater predictability in
reassignment cases and the proposed judicial response to the current circuit split).
23
See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 Statement by President, supra note 5
(indicating that the Bill was part of comprehensive legislation aimed at prohibiting
discrimination against disabled persons, announcing that it was initially supported by
President Reagan’s Administration, and stating that it was likewise largely supported by
Congress).
24
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7) (2000). Disabled
people have been
subjected to a history of purposeful unequal treatment[] and relegated
to a position of political powerlessness in our society, based on
characteristics that are beyond the control of such individuals and
resulting from stereotypic assumptions not truly indicative of the
individual ability of such individuals to participate in, and contribute
to, society[] . . . .
Id.
25
See President George H. Bush, Remarks of President George Bush at the Signing of the
Americans
with
Disabilities
Act
1–3
(July
26,
1990),
http://www.eeoc.gov/ada/bushspeech.html (declaring that the ADA’s prohibitions on
discrimination are “long overdue[]” and that because of the pervasiveness of the barriers
preventing people with disabilities from being equal citizens, “sledgehammer[ing] . . . [yet]
another wall[]” is necessary to provide the “basic guarantee of life, liberty, and the pursuit
of happiness[]” to all Americans) (emphasis added). But see Review and Outlook: The
Lawyers’ Employment Act, WALL ST. J., Sept. 11, 1989, at A18 (“[M]ost Americans are
instinctively sympathetic to the disabled’s problems, and are willing to make a good-faith
effort to enable them to live full lives[,] [but] [t]hey . . . [should not] be sledgehammered into
decency.”) (emphasis added).
26
See President George Bush at the Signing, supra note 25 (noting the worldwide
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quickly and by a wide margin in the Senate in September 1989 and in the
House of Representatives in May 1990.27
Part II discusses the ADA’s passage, the problems that have arisen
since its enactment, and the circuit split concerning its reassignment
provision.28 More specifically, Part II.A discusses why the ADA was
enacted and what protection it provides to the disabled.29 Part II.B
considers the involvement of the United States Supreme Court and
Circuit Courts of Appeals in interpreting the ADA.30 Part II.C sets forth
the current circuit split regarding whether the ADA requires an
employer to reassign a qualified, disabled employee over a morequalified person.31
attention generated by the ADA, and indicating that, as a result, other countries had
recognized the United States as a leader in the area of human disability rights; and,
correspondingly, suggesting that several international leaders expressed interest in
enacting similar legislation); 136 CONG. REC. H2325–01 (1990) (statement of Rep. Neal of
Massachusetts) (arguing for the passage of the ADA, and mentioning the positive impact
that the law was expected to have on the economy). Contra Review and Outlook, supra note
25, at A18 (acknowledging that opponents of the ADA admire the good intentions behind
the Bill but oppose it nonetheless because of its numerous deficiencies, such as its vague
terminology, and because of the uncertainty of the costs that will be incurred by businesses
and employers).
27
See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 Statement by President, supra note 5
(noting that the President signed the bill into law on July 26, 1990); House Overwhelmingly
Approves Bill to Bar Employment Bias Against Disabled, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 100, at A16 (May 23, 1990) (noting that just eight months after the Senate passed its version of the
ADA, the House passed its version of the ADA on May 22, 1990 with 403 votes in favor of
it and a mere twenty votes opposing it); Senate Passage of Civil Rights Bill Moves Debate over
Disabled to House, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 174, at A-5 (Sept. 11, 1989) (observing that the
Senate passed its rendition of the ADA on September 7, 1989 by a vote of seventy-six to
eight); Bill to Prohibit Employment Discrimination Against Disabled Introduced into Senate,
House, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 90, at A-7 (May 11, 1989) (indicating that the bill was
introduced into Congress on May 9, 1989). The Senate passed its version of the ADA
barely four months after the bill was introduced into the Senate, and President George H.
W. Bush signed it into law during a grand ceremony sixty-five days after the House passed
its version (less than fifteen months after it was first introduced into Congress). Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990 Statement by President, supra note 5; House Overwhelmingly
Approves Bill, supra, at A-16; Senate Passage of Civil Rights Bill, supra, at A-5; Bill to Prohibit
Employment Discrimination Against Disabled, supra, at A-7. See also Thomas H. Barnard, The
Americans with Disabilities Act: Nightmare for Employers and Dream for Lawyers?, 64 ST.
JOHN’S L. REV. 229, 252, 230–31 (1990) (describing the ADA as “well-conceived and wellintended[]”).
28
See infra Part II (discussing why the ADA was enacted, the litigation it has spawned,
and the current circuit split regarding interpreting the Act’s reassignment obligation).
29
See infra Part II.A (explaining why the ADA was passed and what protection it
provides).
30
See infra Part II.B (describing how courts have interpreted the ADA, and providing
numerous examples of extensive involvement by the courts in interpreting the Act’s
ambiguous provisions).
31
See infra Part II.C (presenting the circuit split concerning whether an employer is
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A. The Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990: What It Was Intended to
Protect
In 1990, President George H. W. Bush signed the ADA into law and
declared that the purpose of the landmark legislation was to prohibit
discrimination against people with disabilities.32 The ADA closely
resembles the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (“Rehabilitation Act”).33 In fact,
wherever possible, Congress incorporated the language and standards of
the Rehabilitation Act into the ADA.34 The significant difference
between the two laws is that the requirements of the Rehabilitation Act
apply only to federal government agencies, government contractors, and
recipients of federal funds, whereas the ADA applies to enterprises in
both public and private sectors.35 In particular, the ADA addresses

required to waive its policy of hiring the most-qualified candidate in order to reassign a
qualified, disabled employee to a vacant job).
32
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 Statement by President, supra note 5, at 601–
02. In signing the ADA, President George H. W. Bush noted the nation’s history of
pervasive discrimination against people with disabilities. Id. In his words, the ADA
represented one piece of the nation’s comprehensive plan “to ban discrimination against
persons with disabilities[]” and “[to] end . . . the unjustified segregation and exclusion of
persons with disabilities from the mainstream of American life.” Id. (emphasis added). See
also President George Bush at the Signing, supra note 25. In his speech at the signing of the
ADA, President Bush referred to the legislation as a “declaration of equality for people with
disabilities[.]” Id. at 1 (emphasis added).
33
See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 Statement by President, supra note 5
(noting the similarities between the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (“Rehabilitation Act”) and
the ADA).
34
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 Statement by President, supra note 5 (stating
that Congress incorporated much of the language from the Rehabilitation Act into the ADA
to ensure that the ADA would be easily understood by those already bound by the
requirements of the Rehabilitation Act). But see C.F.R. § 1630.1(a), App. (2000) (stating that
the ADA employed the term “disabilit[y]” to replace the outdated term “handicap[]” in the
Rehabilitation Act, that the two terms are substantively equivalent, and that both laws now
use the term “disabilit[y]”).
35
29 U.S.C. § 794 (2000). The Rehabilitation Act applies to programs and activities that
receive federal financial assistance. Id. See also Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42
U.S.C. §§ 12111–213 (2000). Title I of the ADA applies to employers, defined as “a person
engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has 15 or more employees for each
working day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar
year[.]” Id. § 12111(5)(a). Title II applies to public entities. Id. §§ 12131–65. Title III applies
to owners and operators of places of public accommodation. Id. §§ 12181–89. Title IV
applies to common carriers engaged in certain interstate and intrastate communication. 47
U.S.C. § 225. See also Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 Statement by President, supra
note 5. In his official statement accompanying the signing of the ADA, President George H.
W. Bush indicated that the Rehabilitation Act had effected positive changes in the federal
sector and that he was confident that the ADA would effect similar change in the private
sector. Id.
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discrimination based on disability in the areas of employment and public
services, programs, activities, and accommodations.36
Congressional findings at the time the ADA was enacted revealed
that 43,000,000 people in the United States suffered from a disability, and
that the number of disabled Americans was likely to grow.37 Congress
expressly acknowledged the nation’s historical tendency to isolate and
segregate people with disabilities.38 Furthermore, Congress recognized
that laws existed to protect people from discrimination based on race,
color, religion, sex, national origin, and age, but similar protection was
not yet available for people with disabilities.39 As a result, people with
disabilities continued to face widespread discrimination and inequality,

36
42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–213 (2000); 47 U.S.C. § 225 (2000). The ADA is divided into five
titles. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–213 (2000); 47 U.S.C. § 225 (2000). Title I addresses employment.
42 U.S.C. §§ 12111–17. Title II addresses public services, including public transportation.
Id. §§ 12131–65. Title III addresses public accommodations and services operated by
private entities, including places of lodging, food establishments, places of public
gatherings and education, and shopping centers. Id. §§ 12181–89. Title IV addresses
telecommunications. 47 U.S.C. § 225 (2000). Title V addresses miscellaneous items,
including statutory construction, state immunity, prohibitions against retaliation,
attorney’s fees, and amendments to the Rehabilitation Act. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12201–13.
37
42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1). See also S. REP. NO. 101–116, at 9 (1989). The Senate
Committee on Education and Human Resources reported that sixty-six percent of disabled
Americans, translating to nearly 8.2 million disabled people who were of working age but
unemployed, stated that they wanted to work but were unable to secure a job. Id. See also
134 CONG. REC. S5106, S5115 (1988) (statement of Sen. Simon). A poll revealed that fifty
percent of disabled people attributed their unemployment status to employment disability
discrimination. Id.
38
42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2) (stating that congressional findings show that “historically,
society has tended to isolate and segregate individuals with disabilities, and, despite some
improvements, such forms of discrimination against individuals with disabilities continue
to be a serious and pervasive social problem[]”).
39
Id. § 12101(a)(4) (“[U]nlike individuals who have experienced discrimination on the
basis of race, color, sex, national origin, religion, or age, individuals who have experienced
discrimination on the basis of disability have often had no legal recourse to redress such
discrimination[] . . . .”). See also, e.g., The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967,
29 U.S.C. § 621 (2000). The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 prohibited
discrimination in employment based on age. Id. See also, e.g., Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29
U.S.C. § 794 (2000). Although the Rehabilitation Act provided some protection to people
with disabilities in certain government sectors, it was not nearly as expansive as the
protection provided to those of other protected groups, such as race, color, religion,
national origin, and age. Id. See also, e.g., Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e (2000). Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”) prohibited
discrimination in employment based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Id. See
also, e.g., The Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3607 (2000). The Fair Housing Act of
1968 prohibited discrimination in housing based on race, color, national origin, or age. Id.
See also Ruth Colker, Homophobia, AIDS Hysteria, and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 8 J.
GENDER RACE & JUST. 33, 33 (2004) (noting that, advocating for the ADA, Sen. Robert Dole
of Kansas referred to disabled people as the “‘last minority’”).
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and Congress passed the ADA to prevent such maltreatment from
continuing.40
Once the ADA was enacted, however, concerns quickly surfaced as
to the ambiguity of the statute’s requirements, the cost ramifications
associated with implementing certain processes, and the overall
unmanageability of providing appropriate accommodations required by

42 U.S.C. § 12101. The ADA states:
(a) Findings The Congress finds that— . . .
(3) discrimination against individuals with disabilities persists in
such critical areas as employment, housing, public accommodations,
education,
transportation,
communication,
recreation,
institutionalization, health services, voting, and access to public
services; . . .
(5) individuals with disabilities continually encounter various forms
of discrimination, including outright intentional exclusion, the
discriminatory effects of architectural, transportation, and
communication barriers, overprotective rules and policies, [society’s]
failure to make modifications to existing facilities and practices,
exclusionary qualification standards and criteria, segregation, and
relegation to lesser services, programs, activities, benefits, jobs, or
other opportunities;
(6) census data, national polls, and other studies have documented
that people with disabilities, as a group, occupy an inferior status in
our society, and are severely disadvantaged socially, vocationally,
economically, and educationally; . . .
(8) the Nation’s proper goals regarding individuals with disabilities
are to assure equality of opportunity, full participation, independent
living, and economic self-sufficiency for such individuals; and
(9) the continuing existence of unfair and unnecessary discrimination
and prejudice denies people with disabilities the opportunity to
compete on an equal basis and to pursue those opportunities for which
our free society is justifiably famous, and costs the United States
billions of dollars in unnecessary expenses resulting from dependency
and nonproductivity.
Id. § 12101(a). The purpose of the ADA is well-documented. Id. § 12101(b). The
ADA’s purpose statement provides as follows:
(b) Purpose It is the purpose of this chapter—
(1) to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the
elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities;
(2) to provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards
addressing discrimination against individuals with disabilities;
(3) to ensure that the Federal Government plays a central role in
enforcing the standards established in this chapter on behalf of
individuals with disabilities; and
(4) to invoke the sweep of congressional authority, including the
power to enforce the fourteenth amendment and to regulate
commerce, in order to address the major areas of discrimination
faced day-to-day by people with disabilities.
Id. (emphasis added).
40
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the statute.41 Businesses and employers sought to understand precisely
what was meant by the Act’s terminology, such as “qualified individual
with
a
disability[,]”
“essential
functions[,]”
“reasonable
accommodation,” and “undue hardship[.]”42 Entities struggled to
See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 Statement by President, supra note 5
(acknowledging the numerous concerns expressed by businesses and employers within the
private sector, President George H. W. Bush attempted to allay those concerns by focusing
first, on the similarity between the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA, second, on the
flexibility of the approach to determining reasonable accommodation, and third, on the fact
that the phase-in-provisions of the ADA give businesses and employers time to become
familiar with the statute’s requirements). See also Penn Lerblance, Introducing the Americans
With Disabilities Act: Promises and Challenges, 27 U.S.F. L. REV. 149, 149, 163 (1992).
Lerblance outlined the substantive provisions of the ADA, discussed the substantial
changes required by businesses and employers in complying with the ADA’s complexities,
and suggested that the key to achieving compliance with the ADA is “planning[.]” Id. at
163. “The challenges of compliance with the ADA for employers and businesses cannot be
understated. There will be numerous questions and frustrations.” Id. See also Barnard,
supra note 27, at 230–31, 252 (noting how quickly the ADA was passed after being
introduced by the Senate and pointing to its swift enactment after the “rapid march
through Congress[]” as one reason for the law’s inadequacies; additionally, while
acknowledging Congress’s good intentions and the inherent difficulties of addressing
disability discrimination in employment, adamantly arguing that the burden that the ADA
places on employers is “onerous” and suggesting that the ADA creates problems for
employers that may never be effectively resolved); Paul Stephen Dempsey, The Civil Rights
of the Handicapped in Transportation: The Americans With Disabilities Act and Related
Legislation, 19 TRANSP. L.J. 309, 330 (1991) (stating that many businesses were opposed to
the ADA and had lobbied against it because of the high costs that were expected to
accompany the requirements, and stating that one attorney claimed that the ADA would
spawn a ‘“nuclear litigation explosion’”); Floyd D. Weatherspoon, The Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990: Title I and Its Impact on Employment Decisions, 16 VT. L. REV 263, 298
(1991) (forecasting that much litigation would result because of the vague terminology
used in Title I of the ADA, the title addressing the employment sector, and expressing
concern that “frivolous claims” would “[u]ndoubtedly[]” be asserted by plaintiffs until the
terms were adequately clarified); Christopher Cox, Toward More Crippling Lawsuits, WALL
ST. J., Oct. 13, 1989, at A14, col. 4 (in which Cox, a United States Congressman from
California, commented on the ADA, “[T]he legislation is one of the most poorly drafted
pieces of legal work I have seen . . . . It’s a model of vagueness[]”); Glen Elsasser, Senate
OK’s Sweeping Disabled-Rights Bill, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 9, 1989, § 1, at 4 (indicating that United
States Senator David Pryor, from Kansas, referred to the ADA as ‘“a lawyer’s dream’”
because of the volume of litigation it was expected to generate); Review and Outlook, supra
note 25, at A18 (describing the ADA as the “Lawyers’ Employment Act” that will most
definitely benefit lawyers because it is a “swamp of imprecise language[]”). But see Bonnie
P. Tucker, The Americans With Disabilities Act: An Overview, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 923, 931
(1989) (“The overall cost of the . . . [ADA] to employers should be minimal[] because larger
employers have two to four years to devise means of complying with the Act, while small
employers will never have to comply.”).
42
See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(8)–(10) (2000). Many terms in the ADA are defined with
terms that can be interpreted broadly or narrowly. Id.; see also, e.g., id. § 12102(2) (emphasis
added) (“The term ‘disability’ means, with respect to an individual—(A) a physical or
mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such
individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such
41
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impairment.”); id. §§ 12102(2), 12111 (showing that “substantially limits” and “major life
activities” are not defined).
Some phrases in the ADA are defined by terms defined in other sections; indeed, this
requires referencing multiple definitions to fully ascertain the meaning of one phrase. Id.
§ 12111. For a covered employer to determine whether it must provide reasonable
accommodation to an individual, it must first consider whether the individual is a
qualified, disabled employee. Id. § 12111(8); § 12111(4) (stating, “The term ‘employee’ means
an individual employed by an employer[]”). Next, it must consider that “[t]he term
‘qualified individual with a disability’ means an individual with a disability who, with or
without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment
position that such individual holds or desires.” Id. § 12111(8) (emphasis added). Thus,
determining whether a person is a qualified, disabled employee requires referring to the
definitions of “employee[,]” “qualified individual with a disability[,]” “disability[,]”
“reasonable accommodation[,]” and “essential functions[.]” Id. §§ 12102(2) (defining
“disability”); 12111(4) (defining “employee”); 12111(8) (defining “qualified individual with
a disability” and “essential functions”); 12111(9) (defining “reasonable accommodation”).
Determining whether accommodation is reasonable also requires referring to the definition
of “undue hardship” because
the term “discriminate” includes[] . . . not making reasonable
accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an
otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is an applicant or
employee, unless such covered entity can demonstrate that the
accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of
the business of such covered entity[.]
Id. § 12112(b)(5)(A). In discussing “essential functions[,]” the ADA sets forth the following
explanation:
For the purposes of this subchapter, consideration shall be given to the
employer’s judgment as to what functions of a job are essential, and if an
employer has prepared a written description before advertising or
interviewing applicants for the job, this description shall be considered
evidence of the essential functions of the job.
Id. § 12111(8) (emphasis added). The reasonable accommodation provision states as follows:
Reasonable Accommodation The term “reasonable accommodation”
may include—
(A) making existing facilities used by employees readily accessible to
and usable by individuals with disabilities; and
(B) job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules,
reassignment to a vacant position, acquisition or modification of
equipment or devices, appropriate adjustment or modifications of
examinations, training materials or policies, the provision of qualified
readers or interpreters, and other similar accommodations for
individuals with disabilities.
Id. § 12111(9) (emphasis added). The definition provided for “undue hardship” is lengthier
and states:
Undue Hardship
(A) In general The term “undue hardship” means an action requiring
significant difficulty or expense, when considered in light of the factors set
forth in subparagraph (B).
(B) Factors to be considered
In determining whether an
accommodation would impose an undue hardship on a covered
entity, factors to be considered include—
(i) the nature and cost of the accommodation needed under this
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comply with the ADA’s requirements, and litigation ensued, forcing
courts to interpret the Act’s vague language.43
B. United States Supreme Court and Circuit Courts of Appeals Decisions:
Interpreting the Ambiguous Provisions of the Americans With Disabilities
Act of 1990
The circuit courts have disagreed greatly as to the meaning of
phrases within the ADA, resulting in many circuit splits.44 The United
chapter;
the overall financial resources of the facility or facilities
involved in the provision of the reasonable accommodation;
the number of persons employed at such facility; the effect
on expenses and resources, or the impact otherwise of such
accommodation upon the operation of the facility;
(iii) the overall financial resources of the covered entity; the
overall size of the business of a covered entity with respect
to the number of its employees; the number, type, and
location of its facilities; and
(iv) the type of operation or operations of the covered entity,
including the composition, structure, and functions of the
workforce of such entity; the geographic separateness,
administrative, or fiscal relationship of the facility or
facilities in question to the covered entity.
Id. § 12111(10) (emphasis added). See also Lerblance, supra note 41, at 149 (predicting that
the ADA will significantly change the way employers do business); Befort & Thomas, supra
note 4, at 71 (commenting on the lack of definitions for key terms and phrases in the ADA,
including “impairment,” “major life activity,” and “substantially limits”). See also Charles
Lane, Justice Criticizes Congress on Disabilities Act Written in a Rush, Says O’Connor, CHI.
TRIB., Mar. 15, 2002. Even Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O’Connor voiced her
frustration with the “uncertainties” embedded in the law. Id. See generally Jerry Zremski,
Disabled Will Have to Enforce New Disabilities Act U.S. Plans to Hire Only 32 People to Police
660,000 Business [sic] Nationwide, BUFFALO NEWS, Sept. 29, 1991. Zremski considered the
opinions of a human resources manager, a senior vice president for operations of a bank,
and an attorney, and noted that the ADA’s vague terminology caused businesses and
employers to worry that, despite their good intentions, they would fail to meet the ADA’s
requirements. Id.
43
See, e.g., infra notes 44–45 49, 52, 56, 74–75 (cases cited). See also Befort & Thomas,
supra note 4, at 29 (commenting on the many issues involving the ADA that were disputed
almost immediately after the ADA was enacted, and indicating that “ADA’s adoption
[quickly] turned into a wail of frustration[]” and spawned a “deluge of litigation”);
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT OF 1990 (ADA) CHARGES FY 1997-FY 2007 (2007),
http://eeoc.gov/stats/ada-charges.html (reporting that 235,465 charges were filed under
the ADA from July 26, 1992 through September 30, 2006).
44
See, e.g., Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd., 545 U.S. 119, 125 (2005)
(acknowledging and resolving a circuit split between the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits as to
whether Title III of the ADA applies to foreign-flag cruise ships); Clackamas
Gastroenterology Assocs., P. C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 444–51 (2003) (responding to a
disagreement between the Second and Seventh Circuits as to whether shareholders are
employees under the ADA).
(ii)
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See also, e.g., Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73, 76, 78 (2002) (citing
Echazabal v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 226 F.3d 1063, 1066 & n.3 (9th Cir. 2000), rev’d, 536 U.S. 73
(2002); Moses v. Am. Nonwovens, Inc., 97 F.3d 446, 447 (11th Cir. 1996); Koshinski v.
Decatur Foundry, Inc., 177 F.3d 599, 603 (7th Cir. 1999)). Deciding an issue in which the
Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits were split as to whether an employer could reject an
applicant when the job he sought posed a danger to his own health, the Court unanimously
decided that an employer may refuse to hire an applicant when the job sought poses a
danger to the same applicant. Id. The Ninth Circuit, turning to the ADA’s statutory text
for guidance, held that the ADA is not a paternalistic statute, and, as such, an employer
could refuse to hire an applicant only when doing so posed a health or safety risk to others.
Chevron, 226 F.3d at 1066 & n.3. When the only health or safety risk was to the individual
applying for the job, the employer could not reject him. Id. But see Koshinski v. Decatur
Foundry, Inc., 177 F.3d 599, 603 (7th Cir. 1999). The Seventh Circuit upheld an employer’s
decision to terminate a disabled employee. Id. Side-stepping the plaintiff-employee’s
argument that the employer’s decision was paternalistic, the court determined that the
plaintiff could not establish a prima facie case because he could not demonstrate that he
was a qualified, disabled employee, i.e., able to perform the essential functions of his job.
Id. Because he could not demonstrate that he was qualified, he could not show that he was
deserving of protection under the ADA. Id. See also, e.g., Moses v. Am. Nonwovens, Inc.,
97 F.3d 446, 447 (11th Cir. 1996). The Eleventh Circuit held that an employer could fire an
employee when his disability (seizure-producing epilepsy) posed a significant safety threat
to himself in his assigned job. Id. See also, e.g., US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391,
393–94 (2002) (addressing the divergent views of the Fourth and Ninth Circuits as to the
legal significance of seniority systems pursuant to the ADA).
See also, e.g., Toyota Motor Mfg., Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 192–93
(2002). In Toyota Motor Mfg., a unanimous Court resolved the conflict that existed among
the circuits and set forth the appropriate test for determining whether an individual’s
disability substantially limits a major life activity. Id. at 187, 202. The appropriate inquiry
is whether the activity that is limited is of central importance to the daily lives of most
people. Id. In determining that raising one’s arms above shoulder length was not such an
activity, the Court narrowed the scope of activity that qualifies as a disability according to
the ADA. Id. At least inferentially, the Court decided that heavy lifting is not a major life
activity, and likely, neither is lifting fifteen pounds. See id. See also, e.g., PGA Tour, Inc. v.
Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 674, 681, 691 (2001) (resolving differing views of the Seventh and
Ninth Circuits as to which events are covered by Title III of the ADA); Sutton v. United Air
Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 496 (1999) (resolving an issue previously decided by nine circuits,
the Court established whether corrective measures should be considered in determining if
a person has a qualifying disability).
See also, e.g., Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998). Prior to Bragdon, in which the
Court affirmed the First Circuit’s finding that HIV is a disability pursuant to the ADA,
many courts disagreed as to whether reproduction was a major life activity and several
courts ruled that because it was not, HIV was not an ADA-covered disability. Id. See also,
e.g., Runnebaum v. NationsBank of Maryland, N.A., 123 F.3d 156, 171–72 (4th Cir. 1997) (en
banc) (holding that neither sexual relations nor reproduction were major life activities, and
therefore, HIV was not a disability even though it limited those activities); Krauel v. Iowa
Methodist Med. Ctr., 95 F.3d 674, 677 (8th Cir. 1996) (citing Zatarain v. WDSU-Television,
Inc., 881 F. Supp. 240, 244 (E.D. La. 1995)) (considering a case involving an employee’s
infertility; holding that reproduction was not a major life activity, and thus, the employee
was not disabled), aff'd, 79 F.3d 1143 (5th Cir. 1996); Cortes v. McDonald’s Corp., 955 F.
Supp. 541, 544–47 (E.D. N.C. 1996) (citing Runnebaum, 95 F.3d at 1285, 1290 (4th Cir. 1996)),
aff’d, 123 F.3d 156 (4th Cir. 1997) (en banc); Ennis v. The Nat’l Ass’n of Bus. and Educ.
Radio, Inc., 53 F.3d 55, 58 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding that a former employee did not show that
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States Supreme Court, in order to resolve these circuit splits, has granted
certiorari in a variety of cases and has interpreted and qualified some of
the statutory text, shedding light on mystifying terms and nuances.45 In
HIV affected a major life activity, and therefore, he was not disabled); Zatarain, 881 F. Supp.
at 244 (considering, as a matter of first impression, whether infertility was a disability;
holding, that reproduction was not a major life activity and infertility was not an ADAcovered disability).
Compare, e.g., Thompson v. Holy Family Hosp., 121 F.3d 537, 539–41 (9th Cir. 1997)
(citing Ray v. Glidden Co., 85 F.3d 227 (5th Cir. 1996), and Aucutt v. Six Flags Over MidAmerica, Inc., 85 F.3d 1311 (8th Cir. 1996)) (holding that the employee’s inability to lift
twenty-five pounds did not substantially limit a major life activity), and Helfter v. UPS, Inc.,
115 F.3d 613, 616–18 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding that the inability of the plaintiff-employee to
lift greater than ten pounds frequently, did not substantially limit her ability to perform a
major life activity), and Glidden Co., 85 F.3d at 229 (deciding that the employee’s inability to
perform “heavy lifting[]” only affected a “discrete task[;]” thus, it did not substantially
limit a major life activity), and Aucutt, 85 F.3d at 1318–20 (holding that a twenty-five pound
lifting limitation did not amount to a substantial limit of a major life activity), and Panzullo
v. Modell’s Pa., Inc., 968 F. Supp. 1022, 1026 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (finding that the employee’s
disability did not substantially limit a major life activity because it only excluded him from
a narrow class of jobs), with Williams v. Channel Master Satellite Sys., Inc., 101 F.3d 346,
349 (4th Cir. 1996) (relying on opinions of the Fourth and Fifth Circuits, and finding that
working is a major life activity), abrogated by Toyota Motor Mfg., 534 U.S. at 187, 202, and
Lowe v. Angelo’s Italian Foods, Inc., 87 F.3d 1170, 1174 (10th Cir. 1996) (recognizing that
the inability to lift fifteen pounds could qualify as a disability, and therefore precluded
summary judgment).
See also Befort, supra note 11, at 931, 932–33 (stating that many courts have considered
the meaning of terms within the ADA, such as “disability” and “reasonable
accommodation”). See also Befort & Thomas, supra note 4, at 30. Referring to the “wide
divergence of [judicial] opinion” on a variety of issues involving the ADA and indicating
that judicial response is “startlingly diverse[,]” Befort & Thomas stated as follows:
On issue after issue, the circuit courts of appeal are split and/or are in
disagreement with the EEOC. These disagreements go to some
fundamental concepts under the ADA, such as who is a protected
“individual with a disability” and which party bears the burden of
establishing the availability of a reasonable accommodation.
Id. See generally, e.g., Peggy R. Mastroianni, Recent Decisions Under the Americans With
Disabilities Act, SM027 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 221 (2006) (for educational use only). Nearly twenty
years after its passage, conflicting views flourish as to the requirements that the ADA
imposes on employers. Id. Mastroianni listed more than eighty circuit court decisions
involving the ADA in the employment context that were decided during 2005 and 2006. Id.
45
See, e.g., Spector, 545 U.S. at 129, 125, 135–36 (produced 4 separate opinions) (resolving
a circuit split as to the scope of the ADA, and shedding light on language within Title III of
the ADA, which exempts an entity from the requirement of providing reasonable
accommodation if such accommodation is not “readily achievable[;]” and, in doing so,
deciding that a cruise ship is exempt from the reasonable accommodation requirement to
the extent that it shows that providing such accommodation would pose a significant
safety risk to others); Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 51–52, 55 (2003) (unanimous
opinion, except that Justice Souter took no part in the decision and Justice Breyer took no
part in the consideration or the decision) (overturning the Ninth Circuit’s pro-employee
ruling, and announcing that an employer may enforce an across-the-board policy to refuse
to re-hire employees who previously engaged in misconduct in violation of company
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policy; and, accordingly, finding that where an applicant is unable to show that the
employer discriminated based on previous drug use and, thus, based on apparent record of
disability, the same applicant may not prevail on a “record of” disability theory, even
though he may be able to prove that he was a rehabilitated drug addict); Clackamas, 538
U.S. at 449, 444–51 (7-2 majority opinion) (reversing and remanding the ruling of the Ninth
Circuit, and addressing the then-existing circuit split by setting forth that the appropriate
approach for determining whether shareholder-director-physicians fall within the ADA’s
definition of “employee[]” is to apply the six-factor inquiry established by the EEOC,
thereby acknowledging the persuasiveness of the EEOC’s published guidelines); Barnes v.
Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 189 (2002) (unanimous opinion) (vacating a punitive damages award
of $1.2 million, and deciding that punitive damages are not permitted in private suits
under the ADA); Chevron, 536 U.S. at 76, 78 (unanimous opinion) (acknowledging the
“conflict[]” and “tension” among the circuits as to the issue presented, the Court reversed
and remanded the Ninth Circuit’s opinion and held that an employer may refuse to hire a
person when the job being sought would endanger that person’s health because of the
person’s disability); US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 393–94 (2002) (5-4 majority
opinion) (produced 5 separate opinions) (addressing a circuit split, and holding that when
an employer demonstrates that reassigning a disabled employee interferes with its
seniority rules, the employer will usually be able to show that such a reassignment is not a
reasonable accommodation, but also stating that an employee may present evidence of
special circumstances that make an exception to the seniority rule reasonable in certain
circumstances); Toyota Motor Mfg., 534 U.S. at 187, 202 (unanimous opinion) (clarifying the
meaning of “substantially limit . . . major life activities[]” by stating that, in order to fall
within the ADA’s purview, the activities that are limited by a disability must be “of central
importance to [the] daily lives[]” of “most people[,]” not just of the particular person in
question; and, after significantly narrowing the scope of the arguably ambiguous
phraseology, the Court applied its new narrow definition, deciding that an employee’s
inability to raise her arms above her shoulders did not establish that she was substantially
limited in a major life activity); PGA Tour, Inc., 532 U.S. at 674, 681, 691 (2001) (7-2 majority
opinion) (resolving a “conflict between th[]e courts[,]” and holding that a professional golf
tournament falls within the reach of public accommodations as intended by Title III of the
ADA, and determining that the entity sponsoring a golf tournament was required to allow
a disabled professional golfer to use a golf cart instead of walking the course as a means of
reasonable accommodation required by the ADA); Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527
U.S. 581, 600 (1999) (6-3 majority opinion) (clarifying that to comply with the antidiscrimination provision within Title II of the ADA, a state must place people with mental
disabilities in community settings when the disability is the factor keeping them out of
such a community and placement can be reasonably accommodated; and, in addition,
stating that unjustifiably isolating a person because of his disability is discrimination
prohibited by the ADA); Albertson’s, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 558, 565–66, (1999)
(unanimous opinion) (deciding that whether a person possesses a disability pursuant to the
ADA must be a case-by-case determination, and in this matter, the employer properly
considered the employee’s ability to control his impairment and the employer’s obligation
to fully comply with Department of Transportation regulations); Kolstad v. Am. Dental
Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526, 547-48 (1999) (dictum) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a)–(b) (2000)) (discussing
that the Civil Rights Act of 1991 provides remedies for certain violations of the ADA);
Murphy v. UPS, Inc., 527 U.S. 516, 521 (1999) (7-2 majority opinion) (finding that mitigating
measures, including medications taken, assist in determining whether an individual has a
disability as defined by the ADA, and in this case, determining that employee-Murphy did
not have a disability because when he was medicated, his high blood pressure did not
substantially limit any major life activity); Sutton, 527 U.S. at 477, 480, 482, 495–96 (7-2
majority opinion) (ruling against the recommendation of the Equal Employment
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addition, the Court has addressed the relationship of the ADA to the
Eleventh Amendment and congressional abrogation issues.46 Several of
the Court’s opinions were 5-4, with stinging dissents, proving that the
ADA is not easy to decipher.47 Because the language in the ADA is
susceptible to both broad and narrow interpretations and the members
of the Court have expressed widely divergent views when interpreting
the Act, the Court’s opinions have allowed the vicious cycle of litigation
to continue.48
Opportunity Commission and against eight of the nine federal circuit courts that had
previously decided this issue, the Court concluded that the effect of corrective measures, in
this case eyeglasses, should be considered in determining whether an individual’s
impairment substantially limits one or more major life activity, thus, denying, in this case,
the plaintiffs’ alleged disabilities); Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 628, 637, 641–42, 648–55 (5-4 majority
opinion) (affirming the First Circuit, and holding that HIV constitutes a disability under the
ADA, even before it progresses to full-blown Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
(AIDS) because it is a physical impairment that substantially limits the major life activity of
reproduction; and, additionally, providing guidance concerning the “direct threat”
provision within Title II of the ADA and how an entity should evaluate objective evidence
in determining whether a person’s disability poses a “direct threat[,]” thereby exempting
the entity from the reasonable accommodation requirement); Pennsylvania Dep’t of Corr.
v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 213 (1998) (unanimous opinion) (clarifying that the reach of Title II
of the ADA extends protection to qualified, disabled inmates in state prisons).
46
See, e.g., United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151, 159 (2006) (unanimous opinion)
(deciding that Title II of the ADA appropriately abrogates state sovereign immunity and
creates a private cause of action against a state for violating the Fourteenth Amendment;
and, ultimately, holding that a prison inmate had a valid cause of action against the state
Department of Corrections and prison officials); Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 517–44
(2004) (5-4 majority opinion) (holding that even though according to its 2001 ruling in Bd. of
Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 360 (2001), in which it declared that under Title I
of the ADA, the Eleventh Amendment prohibits a private party from seeking money
damages for a state’s violation, a private party may seek money damages for a state’s
violation under Title II of the ADA, at least as it relates to a violation of the fundamental right
of access to courts); Garrett, 531 U.S. at 360 (5-4 majority opinion) (concluding that the
Eleventh Amendment prohibits a private party from seeking money damages for a state’s
violation of Title I of the ADA).
47
See, e.g., Spector, 545 U.S. at 125 (producing four separate opinions in response to a
circuit split); Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 533–34 (Rehnquist, C.J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which
Kennedy and Thomas, JJ., joined; Scalia, J., filed a dissenting opinion; Thomas, J., filed a
dissenting opinion); Barnett, 535 U.S. at 393–94 (Scalia, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in
which Thomas, J., joined; Souter, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Ginsburg, J.,
joined) (producing five separate opinions in response to a circuit split); Garrett, 531 U.S. at
360 (Breyer, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg, JJ.,
joined); Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 637, 639, 641–42, 648–55 (Rehnquist, C.J., filed an opinion
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part, in which Scalia and Thomas, JJ.,
joined, and in Part II of which O’Connor, J., joined; O’Connor, J., filed an opinion
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part); Befort, supra note 11, at 931
(discussing the “startling diversity of judicial interpretation on a host of key ADA
issues[]”).
48
See Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. 408 (1792) (establishing that the Court must avoid
rendering recommendations and advisory opinions; instead, rulings must pertain to actual
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Additionally, ADA cases involve highly fact-specific determinations;
therefore, plaintiff-litigants, in cases involving alleged violations of the
ADA, proceed to court hoping to demonstrate that their fact pattern is
slightly different than others previously presented to the Court.49 Given
controversies presented); Befort, supra note 11, at 931 (indicating that judicial disagreement
concerning interpreting the ADA’s language has produced a “litigation explosion,” and
suggesting that because the Court has a duty to limit its decision to the narrow facts before
it and has been sharply divided in interpreting the ambiguities embedded in the ADA, the
large number of majority, concurring, and dissenting ADA opinions produced by the Court
provide plaintiffs with a foundation for litigating similar cases); Befort & Thomas, supra
note 4, at 71–72 (noting that the phrases included in the ADA are poorly defined); see also
Brian East, Struggling to Fulfill Its Promise the ADA at 15, 68 TEX. B.J. 614 (2005) (arguing that
judicial opposition exists toward the ADA preventing disabled individuals from reaping its
intended benefits, and citing the number of cases lost by ADA plaintiffs to support this
claim); Michael H. Fox & Robert A. Mead, The Relationship of Disability to Employment
Protection Under Title I of the ADA in the United States Circuit Courts of Appeal, 13 KAN. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 485 (2004) (arguing that the ADA has not produced the positive results that
were expected because the Court has narrowly construed the ADA and has rendered it
relatively meaningless for people with disabilities). See also Thomas W. Snyder, Ten Year
Analysis: Is the ADA Meeting Its Goals?, 14-NOV CBA Rec. 36, 36 (2000) (for educational use
only). Referring to the extensive litigation that has ensued over the years involving Title I
of the ADA, Snyder noted that courts continue to “grapple” with the requirements that the
ADA imposes on employers. Id. One of the most frequently litigated issues is whether an
employee’s disability actually amounts to an ADA-covered disability. Id. at 37. See also
supra Part II.B (reviewing basic issues relating to the ADA that have been debated in the
courts in recent years). But see Snyder, supra, at 38 (stating that, overall, employers are
following the ADA requirements and providing reasonable accommodation to employees);
John L. Wodatch, Jr., Enforcing the ADA: Looking Back on a Decade of Progress, SF12 A.L.I.A.B.A. 229, 232 (2001) (for educational use only) (discussing the overall positive effects that
the ADA has produced, and noting, in particular, that employers are increasingly
employing people with disabilities); ANNIVERSARY OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES
ACT, 2006 A PROCLAMATION BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (July 26,
2006), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/07/20060725-3.html (reflecting
on the sixteen years since the ADA’s passage, and reviewing the nation’s progress in
removing barriers for people with disabilities); ENFORCING THE ADA: LOOKING BACK ON A
DECADE OF PROGRESS (2000), http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/ada/pubs/10thrpt.pdf (citing
examples of the ADA’s successes in the area of employment).
49
See, e.g., Swart v. Premier Parks Corp., 88 F. App’x 366, 368–70 (10th Cir. 2004)
(unpublished). Testing the boundaries of the ADA, a former employee argued that breast
cancer caused her to lose her breast, resulting in disfigurement that substantially limited
her ability to engage in reproductive and sexual activities. Id. To show that her employer
discriminated against her pursuant to the ADA, she attempted to rely on Sutton, which
called for an individualized determination of her impairment, and Bragdon, which held that
reproduction is a major life activity. Id. However, because the plaintiff did not produce
evidence that the loss of her breast actually limited her ability to reproduce, she could not
show that she had a disability, and the court entered judgment for the employer. Id.
See also, e.g., Albertson’s, 527 U.S. at 558, 565–66 (reaffirming Sutton’s holding that the
court must consider the totality of the circumstances in ADA cases). See also, e.g., Sutton,
527 U.S. at 483, 484 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)). Sutton established that “whether a person
has a disability under the ADA is an individualized inquiry.” Id. The Court noted that a
physical condition that does not substantially limit one person’s ability to perform a major
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the vagueness of the statutory terminology and the conflicting views of
the Court, litigants hope to convince a lower court to apply a liberal
interpretation of the ADA to their case.50 Moreover, the case may
eventually force the United States Supreme Court to grant certiorari and
demystify another area of uncertainty within the statute.51 Undoubtedly,
litigants hoped for such clarification in 2002 when the Court granted
certiorari in US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett.52
life activity may, in fact, substantially limit another person’s ability to perform a major life
activity. Id. Each person’s occupation and qualifications must be considered. Id. Thus,
one diabetic person may be disabled according to the ADA, while another diabetic is not.
Id. See also Barnard, supra note 27, at 252 (explaining that the fact-sensitive nature of
alleged ADA discrimination forces attorneys to play “the jury wheel of fortune[]”).
50
See Befort & Thomas, supra note 4, at 30 (indicating that courts are split on many
issues, and suggesting that the outcomes of lawsuits involving the ADA are unpredictable).
See also Lawrence D. Rosenthal, Can’t Stomach the Americans with Disabilities Act? How the
Federal Courts Have Gutted Disability Discrimination Legislation in Cases Involving Individuals
With Gastrointestinal and Other Hidden Illnesses, 53 CATH. U. L. REV. 449, 451, 491–98 (2004).
Rosenthal first examined the reasons courts have been reluctant to accept certain disabling
conditions as disabilities pursuant to the ADA. Id. He next analyzed why plaintiffs are
unsuccessful in establishing that they are qualified for the position in question. Id. Finally,
Rosenthal provided guidance to plaintiffs’ attorneys for “convinc[ing] the courts” to rule in
their favor in future cases. Id. at 491. See also Ronald Turner, The Americans With Disabilities
Act and the Workplace: A Study of the Supreme Court’s Disabling Choices and Decisions, 60
N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 379, 383–84 (2004) (declaring that the uncertainty of various
phrases within the ADA has encouraged parties to head to the courthouse to seek
clarification).
51
See, e.g., Spector, 545 U.S. at 125 (responding to a split in the Fifth and Eleventh
Circuits); Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., P. C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 444–51 (2003)
(settling a circuit split in a 7-2 opinion); Barnett, 535 U.S. at 393–94 (deciding an issue on
which the Fourth and Ninth Circuits were split); Toyota Motor Mfg., Kentucky, Inc. v.
Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 192–93 (2002) (resolving the tension among the circuits); (Chevron
U.S.A. Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73, 76, 78 (2002) (putting a circuit split to rest with a
unanimous opinion); PGA Tour, Inc., 532 U.S. at 674, 681, 691 (rendering a 7-2 opinion in
response to a circuit split); Sutton, 527 U.S. at 477, 480, 482, 495–96 (delivering a 7-2 opinion
to end differing views in the circuits); Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 637, 639, 641–42, 648–55 (setting
forth a rule for deciding an issue that split the circuits).
52
See Barnett, 535 U.S. 391; see also infra note 56 and accompanying text (discussing the
issue in Barnett as to whether an employer must violate its seniority policy in order to
accommodate a disabled employee). The issue in Barnett was widely debated in the lower
courts prior to its debut in the United States Supreme Court. See Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 396.
Compare, e.g., EEOC v. Sara Lee Corp., 237 F.3d 349, 355 (4th Cir. 2001) (acknowledging that
an employer may be required to reassign a qualified, disabled employee to a vacant
position, but holding that an employer is not required to do so in violation of its nondiscriminatory seniority policy), and Cravens v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Kansas City,
214 F.3d 1011, 1020 (8th Cir. 2000) (determining that an employer may be required to
reassign a qualified, disabled employee to a vacant position but is generally not required to
violate a collective bargaining agreement or other non-discriminatory policy), and Aka v.
Washington Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284, 1305 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (en banc) (addressing the
question within the context of a collective bargaining unit, and recognizing that an
employer may be required to reassign a qualified, disabled employee; but, noting that an
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In Barnett, Robert Barnett (“Barnett”), a customer service agent for
US Airways, injured his back and could no longer perform the essential
duties of his position.53 Eventually, he lost his job and sued the
company, claiming that it violated the ADA by failing to provide
reasonable accommodation to him.54 The United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari to determine whether an employer must reassign a
disabled employee, who is unable to perform his job, to a different
position for which he is qualified, but that another employee is entitled
to hold pursuant to the employer’s seniority system.55
employer is not required to do so if it means violating a collective bargaining agreement or
hiring policy), and Dalton v. Subaru-Isuzu Automotive, Inc., 141 F.3d 667, 678 (7th Cir.1998)
(determining that an employer may have a duty to reassign a qualified, disabled employee
but is not required to violate a collective bargaining agreement or seniority system), and Eckles
v. Consol. Rail Corp., 94 F.3d 1041, 1051 (7th Cir. 1996) (deciding that an employer may be
required to reassign a qualified, disabled employee, but not if doing so would violate its
collectively bargained seniority system), with Barnett, 228 F.3d 1105, 1120 (9th Cir. 2002), rev’d,
535 U.S. 391 (2002) (holding that an employer may be required to reassign a qualified,
disabled employee, even when doing so would require it to violate its seniority policy), and
Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154, 1167–68 (10th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (holding that
an employer may be required to reassign a qualified, disabled employee, even when a
more-qualified candidate is available, unless such reassignment would violate its wellestablished collective bargaining seniority policy).
53
228 F.3d at 1108 (9th Cir. 2002), rev’d, 535 U.S. 391 (2002). Barnett had worked for US
Airways as a customer service agent for ten years when he hurt his back while performing
cargo duties. Id. When he returned from disability leave, he invoked his rights under the
company’s long-standing seniority system and transferred to a less physically demanding
mailroom position. Id. Under the same seniority policy, the mailroom position later
became open for bidding, and two employees that possessed more seniority than Barnett
intended to bid on it. Id. at 1108–09. Barnett requested that US Airways make an exception
to its seniority policy, deny the other employees the right to bid on the job, and permit him
to have the mailroom position. Id. at 1109. US Airways allowed Barnett to remain in the
mailroom position while it considered his request for reassignment. Id. Approximately
five months after Barnett’s request, US Airways informed Barnett that it was unable to
make an exception to its seniority policy. Id.
54
Id. More specifically, Barnett argued that he was a qualified, disabled employee and
that the company’s refusal to reasonably accommodate his disability violated the ADA. Id.
Most circuits previously held that an employer was not required to reassign a disabled
employee to a vacant position if doing so meant violating its collectively bargained
seniority system. Id. The Ninth Circuit, addressing this question of first impression for the
circuit, considered whether this situation should be decided differently because US
Airways’s seniority system was not grounded in a collectively bargained agreement. Id.
Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, reversed the district court’s denial of
summary judgment and determined that an issue of fact existed regarding whether the
requested accommodation was reasonable or posed an undue hardship on US Airways. Id.
at 1121–23. The court noted that a seniority system does not automatically prevent a
reassignment request, but instead is merely a factor in the fact-sensitive inquiry. Id. at 1120.
See also supra note 52 (discussing pre-Barnett cases that addressed this issue).
55
Barnett, 535 U.S. at 395–96. The Court acknowledged that “[t]he Circuits ha[d]
reached different conclusions about the legal significance of a seniority system.” Id. at 396
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The Court explained that the ADA states that an employer may not
discriminate against a qualified, disabled employee, that the term
“discriminate” includes “not making reasonable accommodations to the
known
physical
or mental limitations of
an otherwise
qualified . . . employee, unless [the employer] can demonstrate that the
accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of
[its] business[,]” and that ‘“reasonable accommodation’ may
include[] . . . reassignment to a vacant position[.]”56 The Court held that
(citing Barnett, 228 F.3d at 1120 (9th Cir. 2002), rev’d, 535 U.S. 391 (2002); Sara Lee Corp., 237
F.3d at 354). See also supra note 42 (quoting in its entirety the reasonable accommodation
provision, § 12111(9), and the reassignment provision contained therein, § 12111(9)(B)).
See also Barnett, 228 F.3d 1105 (9th Cir. 2002), rev’d, 535 U.S. 391 (2002); Sara Lee Corp.,
237 F.3d at 350–54. When the Fourth Circuit addressed the issue that the Ninth Circuit had
previously decided in Barnett, it disagreed with the Ninth Circuit’s determination and held
that the ADA does not require an employer to waive its non-discriminatory seniority
policy in favor of a disabled employee. Sara Lee Corp., 237 F.3d at 350–54. The facts in Sara
Lee Corp. closely resembled Barnett. Id; Barnett, 228 F.3d at 1108–09 (9th Cir. 2002), rev’d, 535
U.S. 391 (2002). The employee was employed by her employer for eight years, compared to
ten in Barnett. Sara Lee Corp., 237 F.3d at 350–54; Barnett, 228 F.3d at 1108 (9th Cir. 2002),
rev’d, 535 U.S. 391 (2002). The employer’s seniority policy had existed for decades, just like
the policy in Barnett, and the employee requested that her employer allow her to have a
position that a more senior employee had a right to hold. Sara Lee Corp., 237 F.3d at 350–54;
Barnett, 228 F.3d at 1108–25 (9th Cir. 2002), rev’d, 535 U.S. 391 (2002). Unlike the Ninth
Circuit, the Fourth Circuit refused to adopt the notion that an employer is sometimes
required to ignore its bona fide and well-established seniority policy. Sara Lee Corp., 237
F.3d at 354–56.
See also Vikram David Amar & Alan Brownstein, Reasonable Accommodations Under the
ADA, 5 GREEN BAG 2d 361, 362 (2002) (noting that Barnett represents the Court’s first
attempt to make sense of an employer’s obligation to provide reasonable accommodation);
John W. Parry, Supreme Court Agrees to Review “Disability” and Seniority Rights Under ADA
Title I, 25 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 303, 304 (2001) (commenting on the
Court’s decision to grant certiorari in Barnett, and noting that it is the first time that the
Court will directly address the reasonable accommodation provision in the employment
context).
56
42 U.S.C. §§ 12112(b)(5)(A), 12111(9) (2000). See also Barnett, 535 U.S. at 395–96. In
determining whether an employer is obligated to reassign an employee who becomes
disabled in order to fulfill its ADA-duty of providing reasonable accommodation, the
Court considered four provisions within the ADA:
First, the ADA says that an employer may not “discriminate against a
qualified individual with a disability.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). Second,
the ADA says that a “qualified” individual includes “an individual
with a disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can
perform the essential functions of” the relevant “employment
position.” § 12111(8) (emphasis added). Third, the ADA says that
“discrimination” includes an employer’s “not making reasonable
accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an
otherwise qualified . . . employee, unless [the employer] can
demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship
on the operation of [its] business.” § 12112(b)(5)(A) (emphasis added).
Fourth, the ADA says that the term “‘reasonable accommodation’ may
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reassignment is generally not “reasonable[]” when it conflicts with a
seniority system, but that an employee may show special circumstances
to make a seniority rule exception reasonable in a particular case.57
The Court’s 5-4 ruling in Barnett consisted of five separate opinions
and left many questions unanswered as to the scope of the holding and
the types of situations to which it applies.58 One major problem with
Barnett is the vagueness and the apparent unmanageability of the
“special circumstances” language.59 In holding that an employer may be
include . . . reassignment to a vacant position.” § 12111(9)(B) [sic].
Id. at 396.
57
Id. at 394. The majority opinion first rejected the argument asserted by US Airways—
that requiring an employer to violate its seniority policy would always pose an undue
burden on the employer. Id. at 398–406. The Court reasoned that the ADA often requires
employers to make exceptions to work rules in order to provide reasonable
accommodation. Id. at 397–98. For instance, an employer may be required to give a
disabled person extended breaks beyond what is permitted in the employer’s policy, or an
employer may be required to exceed the established furniture budget to accommodate a
disabled employee’s request for a particular type of desk. Id. Thus, the Court concluded
that, by itself, the fact that an employer would need to make an exception to a work rule
does not make a request for accommodation unreasonable. Id. at 398.
The Court next rejected Barnett’s argument that reassignment would always amount to
reasonable accommodation. Id. at 398–99. Eliminating discrimination against people with
disabilities may require an employer to engage in affirmative conduct, but the ADA limits
such conduct to what is reasonable. Id. at 399–402. Congress employed the word
“reasonable[]” to establish a limit on the action that an employer must take. Id. at 401.
Therefore, to say that an employer is required to reassign a qualified, disabled employee to
a vacant position—no matter what policies it must violate in so doing—would expand the
scope of the ADA beyond what Congress articulated. Id.
In holding that an employee remains free to show that special circumstances warrant
an exception to an employer’s seniority rule, the Court gave two examples to illustrate how
an employee might show that his requested accommodation is reasonable. Id. at 405–06.
The plaintiff could show that either (1) the employer has often changed the seniority
system, thereby reducing employees’ expectations that it will be strictly followed, or (2) the
system includes built-in exceptions, such that allowing for another exception will cause
minimal disruption. Id.
58
See infra note 59 (discussing the problem with Barnett’s “special circumstances”
language); infra notes 61–62, 66 (explaining that it is unknown whether Barnett applies to an
employee’s request for a reassignment to a vacant position when such request conflicts
with an employer’s hiring policy, i.e., a policy other than a seniority-based policy).
59
See Barnett, 535 U.S. at 394, 398 (majority opinion). The Court noted that in many
cases, an employer may no longer prevail at the summary judgment stage by merely
showing that an accommodation would violate a company’s seniority policy. Id. at 394.
The Court further noted, “The plaintiff remains free to present evidence of special
circumstances that make ‘reasonable’ a seniority rule exception in the particular case. And
such a showing will defeat the employer’s demand for summary judgment.” Id. As
mentioned previously, the Court expressly invited plaintiffs to demonstrate evidence of
special circumstances, for example, that the employer has previously changed the seniority
policies, thereby reducing employees’ expectations that the policies will not be altered, or
that the seniority policies allow for exceptions to be granted, thereby making one more
exception only minimally troublesome. Id. at 405–06. To this Justice Scalia responded, “I
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required to violate its seniority policy if “special circumstances” exist,
the Court noted other instances, pursuant to the ADA, in which an
employer must make exceptions to its work rules; but, in so doing,
Justice Scalia argued in dissent that by issuing such a vague rule, the
Court would be paving the way for other actions involving alleged ADA
violations to be brought by plaintiffs desiring to test the limits of this socalled “special circumstances” exception.60
Another problem with Barnett is that the Court’s holding appears to
apply only to requests for accommodation that conflict with seniority
systems, but if interpreted liberally would apply to other employment
policies as well.61 In keeping with the Court’s precedent of insulating
have no idea what this means.” Id. at 418 (Scalia, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which
Thomas, J., joined). See also Barnett v. U.S. Air, Inc., 228 F.3d at 1125 (9th Cir. 2002), rev’d,
535 U.S. 391 (2002) (Trott, J., dissenting, with whom O’Scannlain, J., and Kleinfeld, J., join).
Judge Trott, dissenting to an aspect of the majority’s opinion that the United States
Supreme Court later adopted—that a seniority system would not always preclude an
employer from reassigning a disabled employee to a vacant position—stated as follows:
I am troubled by the regrettable position in which we leave employers,
employees, and the lawyers who advise them in connection with these
important and possibly costly decisions. To require them to deal with a
seniority system as “merely one factor” leaves them with no guidance,
none at all. This default portends litigation in every case where a
seniority system blocking the accommodation is respected[] . . . . What
to do with seniority systems in this context is a policy question for
Congress, one which we as judges have no authority or ability to
resolve. We are left with legislation by litigation, and we become a
nation not of laws, but of lawyers.
Id.
60
See supra note 59 (discussing the majority’s rebuttable presumption rule, including the
special circumstances exception, and Justice Scalia’s response to the special circumstances
exception).
61
See Barnett, 535 U.S. at 391–424. As to the scope of its holding, the majority expressly
stated that the case involved a conflict with the employer’s seniority system; thus, the
Court’s holding appears to apply only to situations involving seniority systems. Id. at 402.
In fact, the Court initially summarized the issue by asking, “In such a case, does the
accommodation demand trump the seniority system?” and answered its question by
specifically addressing the relationship between seniority systems and the request for
accommodation. Id. at 394. Leading the majority, Justice Breyer stated:
In our view, the seniority system will prevail in the run of cases. As
we interpret the statute, to show that a requested accommodation
conflicts with the rules of a seniority system is ordinarily to show that
the accommodation is not “reasonable.” Hence such a showing will
entitle an employer/defendant to summary judgment on the
question—unless there is more. The plaintiff remains free to present
evidence of special circumstances that make “reasonable” a seniority
rule exception in the particular case. And such a showing will defeat
the employer’s demand for summary judgment.
Id.
In support of a narrow holding, Justice O’Connor wrote a separate concurring opinion
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in which she stated that the issue could even be more narrowly characterized than the
majority suggested. Id. at 408 (O’Connor, J., concurring). She contended that the issue as to
whether a seniority system affects an employer’s duty under the ADA to provide
reasonable accommodation and reassign a qualified, disabled employee depends solely on
whether the seniority system was a legally enforceable program, providing employees with
contractual rights to hold positions. Id. In her view, under legally enforceable seniority
systems, positions never become vacant; thus, reassignment is not a reasonable
accommodation because it would involve bumping employees out of positions that they
(legally) possess. Id. at 408–10. Pointing to legislative history, she indicated that Congress
did not intend for reasonable accommodation to include bumping employees out of
positions. Id. at 409–10 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 63 (1990), as reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 345; S. REP. NO. 101-116, at 32 (1989)). In seniority systems that are not
legally enforceable, though, employees do not have contractual rights to immediately
possess positions. Id. Moreover, in such systems, an employer’s policies probably contain
caveats, exceptions, or disclaimers that make it likely that the employer will be required to
make an exception to its policy and reassign a qualified, disabled employee to a vacant
position as a way of providing reasonable accommodation pursuant to the ADA. Id. at
410–11. Justice O’Connor would have liked for the majority to conclude that reassigning a
qualified, disabled employee to a vacant position is per se unreasonable when such
reassignment conflicts with the employer’s bona fide legally enforceable seniority system. Id.
at 408–12 (emphasis added). She stated:
“Were it possible for me to adhere to [this belief] in my vote, and for
the Court at the same time to [adopt a majority rule],” I would do
so. . . . “The Court, however, is divided in opinion[.]” . . . [I]n order that
the Court may adopt a rule, and because I believe the Court’s rule will
often lead to the same outcome as the one I would have adopted, I join
the Court’s opinion despite my concerns.
Id. at 408 (internal citation omitted). The majority opinion, and especially Justice
O’Connor’s concurring opinion, suggested a narrow holding that applies only to seniority
systems, i.e., when a request for accommodation conflicts with a seniority system, the
accommodation is generally not reasonable. Id. at 396–406 (majority opinion), 408–11
(O’Connor, J., concurring opinion).
However, the other three opinions in Barnett raise questions as to the narrowness of
the Court’s holding. Id. at 406–08 (Stevens, J., concurring), 411–20 (Scalia, J., filed a
dissenting opinion, in which Thomas, J., joined), 420–24 (Souter, J., dissenting, with whom
Ginsburg, J., joins). First, Justice Stevens was compelled to pen a concurring opinion in
which he posed a number of questions and indicated that the answers to such questions
could impact the Ninth Circuit’s decision on remand. Id. at 407–08 (Stevens, J., concurring).
He stated:
Among the questions that I have not been able to answer on the basis
of the limited record that has been presented to us are: (1) whether the
mailroom position held by respondent became open for bidding
merely in response to a routine airline schedule change, or as the direct
consequence of the layoff of several thousand employees; (2) whether
respondent’s requested accommodation should be viewed as an
assignment to a vacant position, or as the maintenance of the status
quo; and (3) exactly what impact the grant of respondent’s request
would have had on other employees. As I understand the Court’s
opinion, on remand, respondent will have the burden of answering
these and other questions in order to overcome the presumption that
petitioner’s seniority system justified respondent’s discharge.
Id. 407–08 (footnotes omitted). In his concurring opinion, Justice Stevens took the focus
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seniority systems, a narrow reading of the holding seems appropriate.62
In fact, Justice O’Connor, the tiebreaker for the Court, emphasized that in
away from the company’s seniority system, and placed it on factors that were likely to
determine whether reassignment was a reasonable accommodation or an undue burden.
Id. His opinion, thus, at least inferentially, suggested that these same considerations apply
when a request for reassignment to a vacant position by a qualified, disabled employee
conflicts with other hiring or transfer policies. See id. Thus, the Court’s holding—that
reassignment is not reasonable in the run of cases, but can be reasonable when the
employee shows special circumstances—may not be limited to conflicts involving seniority
policies. Id.
Second, Justice Scalia stated that the majority’s opinion suggested that employers
must make exceptions to “all employment rules and practices—even those which (like a
seniority system) pose no distinctive obstacle to the disabled[.]” Id. at 412 (Scalia, J., filed a
dissenting opinion, in which Thomas, J., joined). According to the majority, an employer
may be required to eliminate obstacles wholly unrelated to the employee’s disability and
reassign the disabled employee to a vacant position, even if, for example, another
candidate is more-qualified and would typically be chosen. Id. at 414–16. Justice Scalia
interpreted the majority’s opinion broadly; in doing so, he demonstrated how the majority
opinion advances great “uncertainty” concerning the ADA. Id. at 412, 413–20.
Finally, Justices Souter and Ginsburg dissented. Id. at 420–24 (Souter, J., dissenting,
with whom Ginsburg, J., joins). Because this case dealt with reassignment that would
conflict with a seniority system that was “noncontractual and modifiable at will,” Justice
Souter stated, “there is no reason to think that Barnett’s accommodation would have
resulted in anything more than minimal disruption[.]” Id. at 424 (emphasis added). This
opinion, focusing not on the content of the seniority policy but instead on its
noncontractual quality, called into question other policies, such as hiring or transfer
policies. Id. Indeed, the opinion stated that “there is no reason to think that” any noncontractual policy would ever provide an employer with a valid reason for refusing to
automatically reassign a qualified, disabled employee to a vacant job. Id. Justices Souter
and Ginsburg agreed that, pursuant to the ADA, US Airways should have granted
Barnett’s request to be reassigned. Id. at 420–24.
See also Cheryl L. Anderson, “Neutral” Employer Policies and the ADA: The Implications
of US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett Beyond Seniority Systems, 51 DRAKE L. REV. 1, 3 (2002).
Anderson noted that the Court “muddied the waters” when it stated that an employee can
present evidence of special circumstances that make a seniority rule exception reasonable
in a particular case. Id. at 27. Anderson explained that Barnett left many issues illaddressed, and, if interpreted broadly, Barnett could impact the way courts rule in
situations where an employee’s request for reassignment conflicts with other employment
policies, such as transfer policies. Id. at 3; see also Befort, supra note 11, at 960 (noting that
Barnett left much uncertainty in its wake).
See also supra note 57. In Barnett, in rejecting the argument posited by US Airways—
that the ADA never requires an employer to violate its seniority policy—the Court
specifically noted other policies as examples of situations when the ADA requires an
employer to make exceptions to its policies. See also supra note 57. Because the Barnett
Court discussed the benefits of seniority systems, such as fulfilling employee expectations
for fair treatment, although the Court narrowly defined the issue as involving a
reassignment request in conflict with a seniority system, it raised uncertainty regarding
whether its holding would apply to reassignment requests in conflict with other transfer or
hiring policies. See also supra note 57.
62
See supra note 61. As described in the first two paragraphs, Barnett’s majority opinion,
and Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion, both suggest a narrow holding. Supra note 61.
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a legally enforceable seniority system, positions never become “vacant”
because employees have contractual rights to immediately possess
positions, and because Congress certainly did not intend for employees
to be bumped out of positions in favor of reassigning disabled
employees.63 Moreover, in Barnett, the Court specifically discussed the
importance of seniority systems and their role in fostering good
employee-management relations, and in addition, Title VII expressly
provides that bona fide seniority systems are afforded special
protection.64 However, the Court has previously determined that despite
the importance of seniority systems, such systems must sometimes be
ignored.65 Therefore, dissenting in Barnett, Justice Scalia argued that the
lack of a bright-line rule regarding whether an employer is required to
make an exception to its seniority policy would merely foster litigation
and, additionally, that, like seniority policies, other hiring policies also
play an important role in fostering good employee-management
relations, yet the majority’s opinion in Barnett did not resolve whether
Barnett’s rebuttable presumption reasoning would extend to other hiring
policies.66
Indeed, in line with Justice Scalia’s predictions, after Barnett,
disabled plaintiffs who were denied reassignment because of seniority
policies sued employers, hoping to demonstrate that special
The majority even acknowledged the important role that seniority systems have historically
played in maintaining strong employee-management relations. Supra note 61.
63
See supra note 61 (summarizing Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion in the second
paragraph).
64
Barnett, 535 U.S. at 404 (2002). The Court gave several reasons why accommodations
will usually be unreasonable when they conflict with seniority systems, but left many
questions unanswered. Id. at 403–05.
65
See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h). Section 703(h) of
Title VII states that only bona fide seniority systems are afforded special protection. Id.
66
See Barnett, 535 U.S. at 412 (Scalia, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Thomas, J.,
joined). Thus, while the Court decided Barnett within the context of seniority policies, it
indirectly raised the question as to whether its holding applies to other workplace policies;
and, for this reason, Justice Scalia criticized the majority for “[i]ndulging its penchant for
eschewing clear rules that might avoid litigation[.]” Id. More particularly, Justice Scalia
argued that the majority’s opinion left plaintiffs and their attorneys wondering if the same
reasoning applies when a qualified, disabled employee’s request for reassignment to a
vacant position violates the employer’s qualification-based hiring policy. Id. at 414–15. He
contended that the majority’s opinion encourages plaintiffs to bring suit against their
employers every time employers refuse to make exceptions to their transfer and
reassignment policies. Id. at 411–19 (citing EEOC v. Humiston-Keeling, Inc., 227 F.3d 1024,
1028–29 (7th Cir. 2000); Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154, 1164–65 (10th Cir.
1999) (en banc)). Justice Scalia also argued that allowing employees with disabilities to
benefit, merely because of their disabilities, transforms the ADA’s accommodation
requirement into a “standardless grab bag[,]” necessarily requiring plaintiffs to continually
head to court for clarification. Id. at 414, 412–14.
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circumstances existed to make an exception to the seniority system
reasonable.67 In addition, other plaintiffs challenged policies other than
seniority policies, forcing courts to determine whether Barnett applied to
other employment policies, such as a merit-based policy of hiring the
67
See, e.g., EEOC v. Dillon Cos., Inc., 310 F.3d 1271, 1272 (10th Cir. 2002). In Dillon, the
Tenth Circuit decided whether the EEOC’s subpoena requesting information from the
defendant concerning its job vacancies was enforceable. Id. The court determined that it
was enforceable because the requested information could potentially provide the former
employee-plaintiff with information to demonstrate that special circumstances existed that
required the employer to make an exception to its reassignment policy. Id. at 1272, 1276–
77. The court cited to its previous decision in Midland Brake and to Barnett and reasoned
that even the company’s well-established collectively bargained seniority system did not
create an absolute defense for the defendant to withstand the subpoena. Id. (citing Barnett,
535 U.S. at 398; Midland Brake, 180 F.3d at 1167–68). At the summary judgment stage, an
employee is free to show special circumstances that make an exception to a seniority policy
reasonable. Id. (citing Barnett, 535 U.S. at 394, 398). At trial, the employer is free to defend
itself by asserting that its well-entrenched seniority system precluded it from reassigning
the plaintiff. Id. at 1277. However, the court held that at this early stage, the employer
must comply with the EEOC’s subpoena for information. Id.
See also, e.g., Dilley v. SuperValu, Inc., 296 F.3d 958, 963 (10th Cir. 2002) (citing Barnett,
535 U.S. at 398; Aldrich v. Boeing Co., 146 F.3d 1265, 1272 n.5 (10th Cir.1998); Milton v.
Scrivner, Inc., 53 F.3d 1118, 1125 (10th Cir.1995)). In Dilley, the Tenth Circuit acknowledged
that an employer is not usually required to violate its seniority system in order to reassign
a qualified, disabled employee to a vacant position. Id. However, the court cited to Barnett
for the proposition that a seniority system does not act as an absolute bar to reassigning an
employee who becomes disabled. 296 F.3d at 963 (citing Barnett, 535 U.S. at 394). More to
the point, the court recognized that the conflict that the seniority system raised was only a
potential conflict. Id. The court distinguished Barnett on its facts because, in this case, no
other employee covered by the collective bargaining agreement had bid on the vacant job
at issue. Id. Therefore, the court determined that the company could have easily assigned
the disabled employee to the vacant job. Id. Even if someone else with greater seniority
subsequently bid on that job, the employer would not have to violate its seniority policy.
Id. at 963–64. The court reasoned that in such a case, the company could simply refuse to
bump the disabled employee from a non-vacant position. Id. Based on narrowly defining
the holding in Barnett to apply only to a situation where a direct conflict existed, the court
concluded that the disabled employee in this case was entitled to be reassigned to the
vacant position despite the potential conflict with the company’s well-established seniority
system. Id.
See also, e.g., Hines v. Chrysler Corp., 231 F. Supp. 2d 1027 (D. Colo. 2002). In Hines,
the court was asked to determine whether a qualified, disabled employee was required to
show that a vacant job existed to survive summary judgment on a claim alleging that the
employer discriminated pursuant to the ADA’s reassignment provision. Id. Claiming to
decide the narrowly defined issue as a matter of first impression within the Tenth Circuit,
the court looked to Midland Brake for guidance, referring to Smith as “the seminal Tenth
Circuit ADA reassignment case.” Id. at 1038. The court made no mention of Barnett, even
though Barnett had been decided five months earlier and dealt directly with reassignment
of a disabled employee in the context of a motion for summary judgment. Id. at 1031–53.
The court ultimately held that at the trial stage, a plaintiff alleging discrimination pursuant
to the reassignment provision must prove that a vacancy existed, but at the summary
judgment stage, a similarly situated plaintiff is not required to tender such proof. Id. at
1053.
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most-qualified candidate for a vacant job.68 Thus, in addressing one
circuit split, the Court cultivated another.69
C. Does the Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990 Require an Employer to
Reassign a Qualified, Disabled Employee to a Vacant Position over a MoreQualified Candidate?
In interpreting the ADA’s requirements for employers, the principal
debate boils down to one question: is the ADA grounded in ensuring
equality, or conversely, in requiring preferential treatment?70 The
68
See, e.g., infra note 74 (discussing Huber). See also, e.g., Peebles v. Potter, 354 F.3d 761
(8th Cir. 2004). In Peebles, an employee, Peebles, became disabled and took disability leave.
Id. at 764. After returning from leave, Peebles could no longer perform his job. Id. He
failed to comply with the employment policy dictating the steps that he needed to take to
be considered for an alternate position in the company. Id. The company subsequently
terminated Peebles, and Peebles alleged that the company discriminated against him
pursuant to the ADA. Id. Peebles sued, claiming that the company should have made an
exception to its policy and reassigned him to a different position because he was disabled.
Id. The court cited to Barnett and noted that the plaintiff did not show special circumstances
to make an exception reasonable. Id. at 768–69. Interpreting Barnett to apply to a policy
other than seniority, the court granted summary judgment in favor of the employer. Id. at
769.
See also, e.g., Giebeler v. M & B Assocs., 343 F.3d 1143, 1145, 1159 (9th Cir. 2003). In
Giebeler, decided in the context of Title II of the ADA, the Ninth Circuit clung to the portion
of the Barnett opinion that noted that preferences are often necessary under the ADA. Id. John
Giebeler, the plaintiff, became disabled when he fell ill with AIDS. Id. at 1114. Because of
his disability, he was unable to continue in his job and began drawing social security
disability insurance, which left him with much less income than he previously earned. Id.
at 1144–45. He needed to move into an apartment that charged lower rent and attempted
to rent an apartment near his mother, so that she would be nearby to help him with his
daily living needs. Id. However, the rental company denied Giebeler’s rental application
because even though he had previously met the minimum income requirement prior to
becoming disabled, he no longer met the requirement. Id. Giebeler requested that the
company allow his mother—who met the minimum income requirement—co-sign for him,
but the company refused to make an exception to its policy against allowing co-signers. Id.
at 1145. The court, citing to Barnett, found that Giebeler’s inability to meet the income
requirement was solely because of his disability. Id. at 1150–51 (citing Barnett, 535 U.S. at 394,
398). The court rejected the defendant’s argument that Giebeler should not be granted an
exception to the policy solely because of his disability. Id. (citing Barnett, 535 U.S. at 397–
98). Instead, according to Barnett, the court indicated that the rental company was required
to make an exception if Giebeler showed special circumstances. Id. Thus, based on the facts,
the court held that the company was required to make an exception to its policy against
allowing co-signers as a way of reasonably accommodating Giebeler under the special
circumstances. Id. at 1159.
69
See infra Part II.C (discussing the circuit split concerning whether an employer must
waive its policy of hiring the most-qualified candidate in order to reassign a disabled
employee unable to perform his existing job).
70
See Anderson, supra note 61, at 7 (stating that some courts analyze an employer’s
obligation under the ADA’s reassignment provision by emphasizing principles of equality
and others focus on principles of affirmative action, and noting that this results in differing
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specific question explored in this Part is whether an employer is required
to reassign a qualified, disabled employee to a vacant position when a
more-qualified candidate is available for that vacant position.71 Is an
employer required to violate its written or implicit policy of hiring the
most-qualified candidate in favor of reassigning a disabled employee?72
The circuit courts are currently split on this issue.73 The Seventh and
Eighth Circuits hold that an employer is not required to reassign a
qualified, disabled employee when a more-qualified candidate exists.74
views expressed by the courts).
71
See Stephen F. Befort, The Most Difficult ADA Reasonable Accommodation Issues:
Reassignment and Leave of Absence, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 439, 439–40, 442, 447–49 (2002).
Befort noted that reassignment is one of the most troublesome areas within the ADA’s
reasonable accommodation provision. Id. The reassignment issue presents itself either
when an employee becomes disabled while employed or an employee’s pre-existing
disability worsens and prevents the employee from being able to continue performing his
assigned position. Id. Befort explained that the reassignment provision has been
problematic because it tends to impose greater burdens on non-disabled employees in the
workplace than other forms of reasonable accommodation. Id. For instance, when an
employer provides a specific type of equipment to a disabled employee or modifies a
disabled employee’s work schedule, it usually has minimal impact on the disabled
employee’s co-workers. Id. However, when an employer reassigns a disabled co-worker to
a vacant position, it “necessarily deprives other employees of the possibility of filling that
position.” Id. at 448.
72
See Befort, supra note 11, at 983. Befort agreed with the narrow holding in Barnett—
that in many cases, an employer is not required to violate its seniority policy to reassign a
qualified, disabled employee to a vacant job. Id. However, Befort stated that, regrettably,
the Barnett Court failed to address how its holding applies in the context of other transfer
and reassignment policies. Id. Thus, while commentators speculate as to how the Court
will rule in the future, the circuits will remain split on this issue until the Court resolves the
controversy. Id.
73
See infra note 74 (reviewing the view of the Seventh and Eighth Circuits—that the
ADA does not require an employer to reassign a qualified, disabled employee over a morequalified candidate); infra note 75 (reviewing the view of the Tenth Circuit—that the ADA
requires an employer to reassign a qualified, disabled employee, even where a morequalified candidate is available, unless the employer demonstrates an undue hardship).
74
See, e.g., Huber v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 486 F.3d 480, 481 (8th Cir. 2007) (citing EEOC
v. Humiston-Keeling, Inc., 227 F.3d 1024, 1027–29 (7th Cir. 2000)) (holding that an employer
that has a non-discriminatory hiring policy of selecting the most-qualified candidate for a
position is not required to reassign a qualified, disabled employee to a vacant position, when
doing so would require the employer to waive its qualification-based hiring policy and
overlook a more-qualified candidate), cert. granted, 76 USLW 3200 (U.S. Dec. 7, 2007) (No.
07-480), cert. dismissed, 2008 WL 114946 (U.S. Jan 14, 2008) (NO. 07-480, R46-008); HumistonKeeling, 227 F.3d at 1027–29 (holding that an employer that has an established nondiscriminatory merit-based hiring policy is not required to reassign a qualified, disabled
employee to a vacant position if doing so would require violating such policy); Burns v.
Coca-Cola Enters., 222 F.3d 247, 257 (6th Cir. 2000) (citing Dalton v. Subaru-Isuzu
Automotive, Inc., 141 F.3d 667, 678–79 (7th Cir. 1998)) (stating that an employer with a
legitimate, non-discriminatory hiring policy is not required to reassign a qualified, disabled
employee over a more-qualified candidate, where the disabled employee failed to abide by
the employer’s transfer policy that required him to apply for a transfer). See also Terrell v.
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Conversely, the Tenth Circuit holds that an employer may be required to
reassign a qualified, disabled employee.75 These two opposing views are
discussed in turn.76
USAir, 132 F.3d 621, 627 (11th Cir. 1998). In Terrell, the court concluded:
[E]mployers are only required to provide “alternate employment
opportunities reasonably available under the employer’s existing
policies.” . . . We cannot accept that Congress, in enacting the ADA,
intended
to
grant
preferential
treatment
for
disabled
workers. . . . USAir
did
not
fail
to
make
reasonable
accommodations . . . especially given that, when part-time reservations
agent positions again became available at USAir, it promptly notified
Plaintiff and allowed her to fill one of those positions.
Id. See also Daugherty v. City of El Paso, 56 F.3d 695, 700 (5th Cir. 1995). The Daugherty
court determined:
[W]e do not read the ADA as requiring affirmative action in favor of
individuals with disabilities, in the sense of requiring that disabled
persons be given priority in hiring or reassignment over those who are
not disabled. It prohibits employment discrimination against qualified
individuals with disabilities, no more and no less.
Id. See also infra note 98 and accompanying text (indicating that the Court granted certiorari
in Huber and was expected to decide the case on its merits, but the parties settled outside of
court before oral arguments).
75
Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154, 1167–68 (10th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (citing
Aka v. Washington Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284, 1304 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (en banc); Mengine v.
Runyon, 114 F.3d 415, 418 (3d Cir. 1997); Gile v. United Air Lines, Inc., 95 F.3d 492, 496–99
(7th Cir. 1996); Monette v. Electronic Data Sys. Corp., 90 F.3d 1173, 1187 (6th Cir. 1996);
Benson v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 62 F.3d 1108, 1114–15 (8th Cir. 1995), and Community
Hosp. v. Fail, 969 P.2d 667, 678 (Colo. 1998); Ransom v. State of Arizona Bd. of Regents, 983
F. Supp. 895, 902–03 (D. Ariz. 1997)). The Midland Brake court cited to numerous circuit
court opinions for the proposition that the ADA requires an employer to do more than
merely allow a disabled employee, unable to perform his assigned job, to compete for a
vacant position. 180 F.3d at 1167–68. Citing to the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission’s Enforcement Guidance, the court explained that an employer may be required
to reassign a qualified, disabled employee to a vacant position, even though a more-qualified
candidate is available. Id. The qualified, disabled employee need not be the most-qualified for
the vacant position. Id. at 1169.
See also US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 405–06 (2002). The Court held that
when a qualified, disabled employee shows special circumstances, an employer may be
required to reassign the disabled employee to a vacant position even when doing so would
require the employer to breach its seniority policy. Id. Primarily through its dissenting
opinion, Barnett raised the question as to whether an employer may similarly be required
to make an exception to a policy that dictates hiring the most-qualified candidate. Id. at 416
(Scalia, Thomas, J.J., dissenting).
See also, e.g., Boykin v. ATC/Vancom of Colorado, L.P., 247 F.3d 1061 (10th Cir. 2001).
Courts have determined that an employer may be required to reassign an employee who
becomes disabled and unable to perform his assigned job to a vacant position, even though
they were not faced with the specific inquiry concerning whether an employer is required
to reassign such a disabled employee over a more-qualified candidate in violation of a
qualification-based hiring policy. See also id. at 1065 (citing Hoskins, 227 F.3d 719; Monette,
90 F.3d 1173). In Boykin, the court looked to Hoskins and Monette and stated that an
employer is required to reassign an employee who becomes disabled to a position that becomes
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The Seventh and Eighth Circuits: An Employer Is Not Required to
Reassign a Qualified, Disabled Employee to a Vacant Position When
a More-Qualified Candidate Is Available

In 2007, in Huber v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., as a matter of first
impression in the Eighth Circuit, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
considered whether an employer is required to reassign a qualified,
disabled employee, who is unable to perform her existing job, to a vacant
position, even though a more-qualified candidate is available.77 In
Huber, Pam Huber (“Huber”) injured her right arm and hand and could

available within a reasonable amount of time. Id. The court noted that the determination
of what constitutes a reasonable amount of time must be decided on a case-by-case basis in
the totality of the circumstances. Id. See also Hoskins, 227 F.3d at 729 (citing Monette, 90 F.3d
at 1187). In Hoskins, the court acknowledged that an employer may be required to reassign an
employee who becomes disabled and unable to perform his assigned position to a vacant
position or to a position that becomes vacant within a reasonable amount of time. Id. The
court determined that a position that became available well over a year after the employer
learned of the employee’s disability did not constitute a reasonable amount of time. Id. at
729. Therefore, the employer’s obligation to reassign had expired. Id. See also Monette, 90
F.3d at 1187. In Monette, applying broad meaning to the term “vacant[,]” the court
determined that an employer is required to reassign an employee who becomes disabled to a
position that is expected to become available within a short period of time. Id.
See also EEOC Enforcement Guidance (2002). The section of the EEOC’s Enforcement
Guidance that addresses reassignment states that reassignment is “reasonable
accommodation [that] must be provided to an employee who, because of a disability, can
no longer perform the essential functions of his/her current position, with or without
reasonable accommodation, unless the employer can show that it would be an undue
hardship.” Id. (emphasis added). The Enforcement Guidance acknowledges that a
disabled employee must meet the minimum qualifications of the new position, but explains
that “[t]he employee does not need to be the best qualified individual for the position in order to
obtain it as reassignment.” Id. (emphasis added). An employee who becomes disabled
does not need to compete for a vacant position because “[r]eassignment means that the
employee gets the vacant position if s/he is qualified for it.” Id. Citing Barnett for support,
the EEOC notes that an employer might need to make an exception to its transfer policy to
ensure that a disabled employee, unable to perform his assigned job, is reassigned to a
vacant position pursuant to the requirements of the ADA. Id. Furthermore, the guidance
stresses that an employer must provide to the employee any training that it would typically
provide to a new incumbent of that type of job. Id.
76
See infra Part II.C.1 (presenting the view of the Seventh and Eighth Circuits—that the
ADA does not require an employer to waive its non-discriminatory policy of hiring the bestqualified candidate because the ADA is not a mandatory preference statute); infra Part
II.C.2 (presenting the view of the Tenth Circuit—that the ADA requires an employer to
waive such a non-discriminatory hiring policy in favor of reassigning a qualified, disabled
employee).
77
486 F.3d 480, 482 (8th Cir. 2007). The court acknowledged the existing circuit split
between the Seventh and Tenth Circuits concerning whether an employer is required to
reassign to a vacant position a qualified, disabled employee unable to perform her assigned
position because of her disability. Id.
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no longer perform the essential duties of her job.78 She requested
reassignment to another position—a router job—and Wal-Mart allowed
her to apply for that position.79 However, Wal-Mart filled the router
position with a candidate more-qualified than Huber, and Huber
initiated a lawsuit, claiming that Wal-Mart violated the ADA when it
refused to grant her reassignment request.80
Huber agreed that the employee selected for the router position was
more qualified than she for that job, but she contended that Wal-Mart
should have nonetheless placed her in the router position because she
was disabled and unable to perform her existing job, she was minimally
qualified for the router position, and the router position was vacant.81
Adopting the view that the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals expressed
in EEOC v. Humiston-Keeling, Inc. and rejecting the opposing view that
the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals expressed in Smith v. Midland Brake,
Inc., the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals determined that an employer is
not required to reassign a disabled employee when a more-qualified
candidate exists—where the employer has a non-discriminatory policy of
selecting the most-qualified candidate.82
Id. at 481. Huber worked as a dry-order grocery-filler for Wal-Mart, earning $12.50
per hour. Id.
79
Id. When Huber could no longer perform the duties of her order-filler job, she
requested reassignment to a router position, and Wal-Mart allowed Huber to apply and
compete with other applicants for the router position. Id.
80
Id. Wal-Mart conceded that Huber had an ADA-covered disability and was qualified
for the router position because she met the minimum qualifications of the router job, but
Wal-Mart asserted that it placed a non-disabled employee into the router position pursuant
to its policy of hiring the most-qualified candidate. Id. at 481–82. Huber later accepted a
different position with Wal-Mart, earning $6.20 per hour. Id. at 481.
81
Id. at 482. Wal-Mart contended that it was not required to violate its bona fide nondiscriminatory policy of hiring the most-qualified candidate in favor of hiring Huber
merely because she was disabled. Id. Although sometimes the qualifications listed for a
particular job are subjective and are challenged because they require an incumbent to be
more-qualified than what is needed to perform the job sufficiently, thereby unfairly
excluding people with disabilities, that issue is beyond the scope of this Note. Here, Huber
did not question whether the required job qualifications were appropriate pursuant to the
router job. Id. at 481–82. See also Yesenia Salcedo, Wal-Mart Settles Disability Case (Jan. 16,
2008), http://insidecounsel.com/section/labor/1613 (noting that at the time Huber settled
this dispute with Wal-Mart outside of court, in 2008, she was employed by Wal-Mart).
82
Huber, 486 F.3d. at 484 (citing EEOC v. Humiston-Keeling, Inc., 227 F.3d 1024, 1027–28
(7th Cir. 2000); Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154, 1164–65 (10th Cir. 1999) (en
banc)). The court in Huber did not address whether an employer’s policy may be implicit
or must be written, because Huber did not contest the legitimacy of Wal-Mart’s policy. Id.
Instead, Huber argued that Wal-Mart discriminated by refusing to make an exception to its
policy. Id. See also Humiston-Keeling, 227 F.3d at 1026. Nancy Cook Houser (“Houser”)
worked as a picker in a warehouse when she injured her right arm. Id. When her injury
prevented her from performing the frequent lifting associated with the picker job, her
employer attempted to provide reasonable accommodation by rigging an apron in a way
78
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Following the Seventh Circuit’s lead, the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals held that the ADA permits reassignment decisions based on
merit, pursuant to an employer’s legitimate hiring policies.83 In so
doing, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals cited to Barnett, which held
that employers are not generally required to waive seniority policies in
favor of reassigning a qualified, disabled employee.84 The court also
relied on previously established principles relating to reasonable
accommodation and undue hardship.85 Currently, the Seventh and
that was intended to help her transport products from one location to another. Id. When
the experiment failed, Humiston-Keeling reassigned Houser to a greeter position at a
temporary construction site. Id. When the temporary position expired, Houser applied for
other positions with Humiston-Keeling. Id. at 1026–27. She met the minimum
qualifications for the jobs she sought, but Humiston-Keeling selected other candidates for
the jobs and ultimately fired Houser. Id. Houser conceded that she was not the mostqualified candidate for the jobs she sought, but argued that her employer had an ADAduty to reassign her because she had a disability, her disability prevented her from
performing her existing job, and she met the minimum qualifications for the jobs she
sought. Id. at 1027. Conversely, Humiston-Keeling contended that the ADA did not
require it to reject a superior applicant in favor of hiring Houser merely because Houser
was disabled and minimally qualified. Id. The Seventh Circuit considered the view that
the Tenth Circuit expressed in Midland Brake (that an employer may be required to waive
its policy of selecting the best candidate in favor of reassigning a disabled employee), but
ultimately disagreed with the Tenth Circuit. Id. In contrast, the Seventh Circuit held that
an employer is not required to violate its non-discriminatory policy of hiring the mostqualified applicant in favor of reassigning a disabled employee to a vacant position. Id.
83
Huber, 486 F.3d at 483 (citing Humiston-Keeling, 227 F.3d at 1028). The Huber court
reasoned:
The contrary rule would convert a nondiscrimination statute into a
mandatory preference statute, a result which would be both
inconsistent with the nondiscriminatory aims of the ADA and an
unreasonable imposition on the employers and co-workers of disabled
employees. A policy of giving the job to the best applicant is legitimate
and nondiscriminatory.
Decisions on the merits are not
discriminatory.
Id. at 483 (internal quotation omitted) (quoting Humiston-Keeling, 227 F.3d at 1028). ‘“[T]he
[ADA] is not a mandatory preference act.’” Id.
84
Id. at 483–84 (citing US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 406 (2002)); see also supra
notes 52–66 (discussing Barnett).
85
Huber, 486 F.3d at 484 (citing Kellogg v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 233 F.3d 1083, 1089 (8th
Cir. 2000) (per curium); Cravens v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Kansas City, 214 F.3d
1011, 1020 (8th Cir. 2000); Turco v. Hoechst Celanese Corp., 101 F.3d 1090, 1094 (5th Cir.
1996)). See also, e.g., Huber, 486 F.3d at 484 (citing Kellogg, 233 F.3d at 1089). In its decision
seven years earlier, the Eighth Circuit stated in dicta, “[A]n employer is not required to
make accommodations that would subvert other, more-qualified applicants for the job.” Id.
(citing Cravens, 214 F.3d at 1020). An employer is not required to provide the employee’s
preferred accommodation, as long as the accommodation provided is reasonable. Id. at
484, 484 n.3 (citing Turco, 101 F.3d at 1094). The Fifth Circuit stated, “‘The [ADA] does not
require affirmative action in favor of individuals with disabilities. It merely prohibits
employment discrimination against qualified individuals with disabilities, no more and no
less.’” Id.
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Eighth Circuits hold that the ADA does not require employers to
disregard their non-discriminatory hiring policies in favor of reassigning
a qualified, disabled employee.86 The Tenth Circuit’s opposing view is
examined next.87
2.

The Tenth Circuit: An Employer May Be Required to Reassign a
Qualified, Disabled Employee to a Vacant Position, Even When a
More-Qualified Candidate Is Available

In 1999, in Midland Brake, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals,
deciding the issue as a matter of first impression among the circuits,
concluded that an employer may be required to reassign a qualified,
disabled employee, who is unable to perform his current job, to a vacant
position, even when a more-qualified candidate exists, unless the
employer can prove that doing so would pose an undue hardship.88 The
court acknowledged that an employer may be able to demonstrate that
certain employment policies make it unreasonable for the employer to
reassign a disabled employee, providing as an example a wellentrenched seniority system giving rise to legitimate expectations by
86
See Huber, 486 F.3d at 484; Humiston-Keeling, 227 F.3d at 1027–29. The Seventh Circuit
explained:
[T]here is a difference, one of principle and not merely of cost, between
requiring employers to clear away obstacles to hiring the best
applicant for a job, who might be a disabled person or a member of
some other statutorily protected group, and requiring employers to
hire inferior (albeit minimally qualified) applicants merely because
they are members of such a group. That is affirmative action with a
vengeance. That is giving a job to someone solely on the basis of his
status as a member of a statutorily protected group. It goes well
beyond enabling the disabled applicant to compete in the workplace,
or requiring the employer to rectify a situation (such as lack of
wheelchair access) that is of his own doing.
Humiston-Keeling, 227 F.3d at 1028–29. See also infra note 98 (noting that the Supreme Court
likely would have resolved the circuit split if it had decided Huber).
87
See infra Part II.C.2 (reviewing the Tenth Circuit’s position that an employer may be
required to reassign to a vacant position a qualified, disabled employee who is unable to
perform his assigned job because of his qualifying disability, even where a more-qualified
candidate is available, unless the employer can demonstrate that such reassignment
presents an undue hardship).
88
180 F.3d 1154, 1167–68 (10th Cir. 1999) (en banc). The court explained that the scope
of an employer’s reassignment obligation is subject to certain limitations that have been
established by the circuit courts. Id. at 1170–08. For instance, the court noted that
reassignment is required only when the employer is unable to provide accommodation to
enable the employee to remain in his current job. Id. at 1170–71. Additionally,
reassignment is limited to existing vacancies; thus, the employer is not under a duty to
create a new job or bump another employee in order to reassign a disabled employee. Id. at
1174–75.
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other employees.89 However, the court added that an employer may
have to modify other policies in order to fully accommodate disabled
employees and in order to carry out the ADA’s reassignment
obligation.90 The resulting opinion turns on what constitutes an undue
hardship, though the court does little to answer the question, other than
to suggest that a showing is made on a case-by-case basis and to
conclude that making an exception to a policy of hiring the mostqualified candidate for a vacancy would not rise to such a hardship.91
In Midland Brake, Robert Smith (“Smith”), a custodial and assembly
worker for Midland Brake, developed a chronic skin condition that
prevented him from performing the essential duties of his job.92 Midland
Brake was unable to identify an alternate position which would
accommodate Smith’s disability, and as a result, Midland Brake
eventually terminated Smith.93 Smith brought an action against Midland
Id. at 1175–76.
Id. The court noted, “On the other hand, other policies of an employer might have to be
subordinated to an employer’s reassignment obligation under the ADA because to do
otherwise would essentially vitiate the employer’s express statutory obligation to employ
reassignment as a form of reasonable accommodation.” Id. at 1176 (emphasis added).
Citing to relevant decisions of federal district courts and the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission Guidance, the court concluded that an employer must modify its
policies to reassign a qualified, disabled employee to an existing vacant position, unless the
employer demonstrates an undue hardship. Id. See also Sid Steinberg, Employee Must
Compete
for
Position
as
Reasonable
Accommodation
(Aug.
8,
2007),
http://www.postschell.com/docs/publications/301.DOC (last visited Aug. 14, 2008)
(proposing that the reassignment debate seems to focus on whether transferring a lessqualified, but disabled employee, over a non-disabled person amounts to an undue
hardship).
91
See, e.g., infra note 165 (noting Befort’s position on reassignment of a qualified,
disabled employee). In line with the holding of Midland Brake, some commentators have
argued that an employer should be required to relax its legitimate, non-discriminatory
hiring requirements in favor of reassigning a qualified, disabled employee to a vacant
position. See infra note 165. These commentators have contended that when an employer
has an opportunity to reassign a qualified, disabled employee to a vacant job, it should give
preference to the disabled employee over non-disabled employees because the nondisabled workers are already more employable than the disabled employee. See infra note
165.
92
911 F. Supp. 1351, 1355 (D. Kan. 1995), rev’d, 180 F.3d 1154, 1167–68 (10th Cir. 1999) (en
banc). Smith worked for Midland Brake for six years in various custodial and assembly
jobs before developing chronic dermatitis which allegedly resulted from ongoing exposure
to chemicals in the assembly department. Id. Midland Brake attempted to accommodate
Smith by providing protective gloves for Smith to wear while he worked. Id. However,
Smith’s skin condition persisted, and he subsequently notified Midland Brake that his
physician had determined that he should refrain from continued exposure to the chemicals.
Id.
93
Id. When Smith told Midland Brake that he could no longer work in the assembly
department, Midland Brake told Smith that it was unable to identify an alternate means of
reasonable accommodation. Id. After Midland Brake determined that it was unable to
89
90
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Brake, claiming that Midland Brake failed to comply with the ADA
when, instead of reassigning Smith to another position, Midland Brake
fired him.94 The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals examined the ADA’s
text, legislative history, prior judicial opinions, and the EEOC’s
interpretive guidance.95 In its en banc opinion, the Court held that an
employer may be required to reassign a qualified, disabled employee to

accommodate Smith, the company informed Smith that it would pay him $20,000 to settle
his open worker’s compensation claim. Id. Then, later that same day, Midland Brake
informed Smith that it was terminating his employment because the company was unable
to accommodate him. Id.
94
Id. Despite the company’s initial attempts to accommodate Smith by providing
protective gloves, Smith filed a complaint in the United States District Court of Kansas,
alleging that Midland Brake unlawfully discriminated against him pursuant to the ADA.
Id.
95
Id. at 1160–70. In response to Midland Brake’s claim that Smith was not a qualified,
disabled employee because he could not perform the duties of his existing job, the court
focused on critical terminology employed within Title I of the ADA. Id. at 1160–61. First,
Title I prohibits discrimination against “‘a qualified individual with a disability[,]’” defined
as “an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can
perform the essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds or
desires.” Id. at 1161 (quoting Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12111
(2000)). The court reasoned that the plain statutory language places an ADA-duty on an
employer to provide reasonable accommodation to a disabled employee who can perform
another job within the company. Id. Next, the court noted that reasonable accommodation
includes “‘reassignment to a vacant position[,]’” not “‘consideration of a reassignment to a
vacant position.’” Id. at 1164 (emphasis added). Finally, the court examined the word
“‘reassignment[,]’” stating that the “‘re’” in “‘reassignment’” implies that it refers to an
existing employee, and “‘assign’” implies that the employer must do something more than
simply allow a disabled employee to compete for an alternate position. Id. at 1164–65.
Therefore, because an employer is required to provide reasonable accommodation and
reassignment is a form of reasonable accommodation, an employer must reassign an
employee who becomes disabled and can no longer adequately perform in his existing job
to a job that he desires. Id. The court also determined that the legislative history showed
that Congress intended for reassignment to be required. The House Committee on
Education and Labor stated:
If an employee, because of disability, can no longer perform the
essential functions of the job that she or he has held, a transfer to
another vacant job for which the person is qualified may prevent the
employee from being out of work and [the] employer from losing a
valuable worker.
Id. at 1162 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 63 (1990), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
303, 345).
Additionally, the court cited more than ten cases decided by nine different circuits to
support its conclusion that the reassignment duty applies to individuals already employed
by the employer. Id. at 1162–64. Finally, the court considered the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission’s interpretive statement, “Reassignment means that the
employee gets the vacant position if s/he is qualified for it.” Id. at 1166–67 (quoting EEOC
Enforcement Guidance (1999) at 44).
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a vacant position, even when it means rejecting a more-qualified
individual.96
Midland Brake, 180 F.3d at 1164–69. The court rejected the dissent’s argument that an
employer should be able to reject a qualified, disabled employee in favor of hiring the best
candidate for an open position. Id. 1167–68. The majority explained:
The dissent would write in an additional exception to the effect that an
employer need not make the reasonable accommodation of
reassignment if it can find a better qualified employee to take the place
of the otherwise qualified individual with a disability.
Id. at 1167.
One wonders whether the dissent would similarly allow an employer
to escape its duty to offer the other enumerated reasonable
accommodations to keep a disabled employee in his or her existing job
by the same expedient of finding a more-qualified person to fulfill that
job. For example, if an otherwise qualified disabled person asks for a
reasonable “modified work schedule” or “modification of equipment”
to keep his or her existing job, could the employer find a morequalified employee to fill the job, and then assert that it was thereby
absolved of its obligation to offer a reasonable accommodation to the
disabled employee? To ask the question is to answer it, yet it points
out how the dissent seeks to single out one listed reasonable
accommodation—reassignment to a vacant position—and denigrate it
to second-class status.
Id. at 1167–68 n.6.
In so doing, the dissent would further judicially amend the statutory
phrase “qualified individual with a disability” to read, instead, “best
qualified individual, notwithstanding the disability.” However, these
are not the words as Congress wrote them, and our duty is to enforce
Congress’ [sic] definition of discrimination.
Id. at 1167–68.
The unvarnished obligation derived from the statute is this: an
employer discriminates against a qualified individual with a disability if
the employer fails to offer a reasonable accommodation. If no
reasonable accommodation can keep the employee in his or her
existing job, then the reasonable accommodation may require
reassignment to a vacant position so long as the employee is qualified
for the job and it does not impose an undue burden on the employer.
Anything more, such as requiring the reassigned employee to be the
best qualified employee for the vacant job, is judicial gloss
unwarranted by the statutory language or its legislative history.
Id. at 1169.
Not a single case cited by the dissent holds that an employer may
abrogate its ADA obligation to offer reassignment as a reasonable
accommodation by the simple expedient of finding another job
applicant that the employer regards as more-qualified. To the extent
the dissent attempts to read language in any of these cases so broadly,
we believe it would conflict with the employer’s statutory duties under
the ADA.
Id. at 1169–70. The court also applied broad meaning to the term “vacant[,]” stating, “‘[A]
vacant position’ includes not only positions that are at the moment vacant, but also
includes positions that the employer reasonably anticipates will become vacant in the fairly
96
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In summary, the view shared by both the Seventh and Eighth
Circuits contradicts the view of the Tenth Circuit concerning whether an
employer is required to reassign a qualified, disabled employee, who is
unable to perform the functions of his assigned job, to a vacant position
when doing so results in rejecting a more-qualified candidate.97 The
circuit split as to whether an employer must forego its nondiscriminatory policies in favor of reassigning a qualified, disabled
employee will press forward, and, perhaps expand, until the Court
settles the debate.98
immediate future.” Id. at 1175 (citing Monette v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 90 F.3d 1173, 1187
(6th Cir. 1996)).
97
See supra notes 74–75 (setting forth the cases establishing the circuit split—Huber,
(Eighth Circuit); Humiston-Keeling, (Seventh Circuit); and Midland Brake, (Tenth Circuit));
supra notes 74, 77–85 (discussing Huber); supra notes 82–83, 86 (discussing HumistonKeeling); supra notes 88–96 (discussing Midland Brake).
98
See Huber v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 486 F.3d 480 (8th Cir. 2007), cert. granted, 76 USLW
3200 (U.S. Dec. 7, 2007) (No. 07-480), cert. dismissed, 2008 WL 114946 (U.S. Jan 14, 2008) (No.
07-480, R46-008); see also Befort, supra note 11, at 984–85 (predicting that the Court will
undoubtedly have an opportunity in the near future to provide additional clarity
concerning the scope of an employer’s reassignment obligation pursuant to the ADA);
Court Takes Wal-Mart Disability Case, AFX UK FOCUS., Dec. 7, 2007 (noting that the Court
granted certiorari in Huber, and, before the case was dismissed, predicting that the Huber
Court would determine “how far employers must go under the [ADA] to accommodate
disabled employees[]”); Editorial, Disabling Fairness: Time for Equal Justice, PITTSBURGHTRIB. REV., Dec. 15, 2007, at COMMENTARY Section, available at http://www.pittsburgh
live.com:8000/x/tribunereview/opinion/archive/s_542821.html (referring to the EEOC’s
current position on the ADA’s reassignment obligation as “absurd[,]” calling it a “muddled
mandate[,]” and arguing, before the Court dismissed Huber, that the Court should uphold
Wal-Mart’s hiring policy). See also Judy Greenwald, High Court to Hear Case on ADA Job
Applicants; Lower Courts Divided on Whether Employers Must Hire Disabled, Less-Qualified
Workers, BUS. INS., Dec. 17, 2007, at 1. This article contains commentary provided by
attorneys before the parties in Huber settled regarding how the Huber Court should rule. Id.
One lawyer observed, “‘[I]t would be a dangerous precedent to write affirmative action
into the ADA by saying you don’t have to hire the most-qualified person for a position[]’”
because hiring the best candidate for a vacant job is “‘one of the cornerstones of
employment law[.]’” Id. Another lawyer, commenting on the recent history of the Court
opined that the Court would likely rule for Wal-Mart. Id. See also Wal-Mart Discrimination
Case Headed to High Court, TIMES UNION, Dec. 8, 2007, § NEWS, at B12 (noting, before the
Court dismissed Huber, that the Huber Court would have a chance to clarify the parameters
of an employer’s ADA reassignment duty); James O. Castagnera, Patrick J. Cihon &
Andrew M. Morriss, Eighth Circuit Holds Employer Does Not Have to Reassign Disabled
Employee to Vacant Position, 23 No. 8 TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT BULLETIN 3 (Aug. 2007)
(for educational use only) (remarking that the Eighth Circuit’s holding in Huber was
appropriate considering the facts involved in the case and prior judicial decisions within
the Seventh and Eighth Circuits); Mark H. Anderson, US High Court To Rule On Wal-Mart
Transfer Of Disabled Worker, http://www.easybourse.com/bourse-actualite/marches/
news-354784?p=1&NewsDate=2007-12-07&en=0 (last visited Aug. 15, 2008) (reporting that
Wal-Mart stated that it followed its standard hiring procedures when considering Huber
for a transfer, that it did not give Huber the job she sought because she was not the mostqualified candidate, and that Huber’s disability did not factor into the decision); Court To
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III. ANALYSIS: THE TENTH CIRCUIT MISINTERPRETED THE AMERICANS WITH
DISABILITIES ACT OF 1990
Requiring employers to choose disabled employees over morequalified candidates, based solely on employees’ disabilities, is
inconsistent with the ADA’s requirements.99 Interpreting the ADA to
require an employer to reassign a qualified, disabled employee gives the
disabled employee, in essence, a trump card over more-qualified
candidates.100 This Part first analyzes why the approach adopted by the
Rule On Wal-Mart Transfer Of Worker with Disabilities (Dec. 10, 2007),
http://affirmact.blogspot.com/2007/12/court-to-rule-on-wal-mart-transfer-of.html
(last
visited Aug. 25, 2008) (noting, after the Court granted certiorari in Huber, that the case
could have resulted in a 4-4 tie because Justice Breyer recused himself from the case
because of owning Wal-Mart stock). See also Jon Hyman, Supreme Court grants cert petition
in Huber v. Wal-Mart Stores, http://ohioemploymentlaw.blogspot.com/2007/12/supreme
-court-grants-cert-petition-in.html (last visited Nov. 8, 2008). After summarizing the facts
in Huber, the author stated:
A ruling for the employee in this case would undermine one of the
most important commandments of employment law—Though shalt
hire the most qualified person. . . . When you don’t hire the best
person, it could lead a court to second-guess your judgment and
question why a member of a protected class was overlooked in favor of
the second/third/fourth/whatever best person. Which illustrates
another important principle of employment law . . . —when you’re
explaining, you’re losing.
Id. (emphasis omitted). See also Allen Smith, Supreme Court To Review Wal-Mart Policy of
Hiring Only the Best (Jan. 2, 2008), http://www.shrm.org/law/library/CMS_024080.asp
(last visited Aug. 25, 2008) (noting that while management employment attorneys were
fairly confident that the Court would rule in Wal-Mart’s favor in Huber, especially in light
of liberal Justice Breyer having recused himself from the case, the Court could have
surprised employers and sided with Huber); Supreme Court Dismisses Huber v. Wal-Mart
from its docket, http://ohioemploymentlaw.blogspot.com/2008/01/supreme-courtdismisses-huber-v-wal.html (last visited Nov. 8, 2008) (asserting, after the Court dismissed
Huber, that employers will simply have to use their best judgment when making
reassignment decisions because until the Court settles the circuit split, the law will vary
across jurisdictions).
99
See supra note 40 (quoting the congressional findings and the ADA’s four-prong
purpose); supra note 42 (quoting specific requirements within the ADA); supra notes 23, 32
(noting the President’s statements concerning the purpose of the ADA); infra Part III.A
(discussing how requiring employers to reassign disabled employees over more-qualified
candidates is incongruent with the ADA’s text).
100
See Brief Amici Curiae of the Equal Employment Advisory Council and the Employers
Group in Support of Petitioner, i, 5, US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391 (2002) (No. 001250) (arguing that requiring an employer to reassign a qualified, disabled employee to a
vacant position gives the disabled employee a trump card over more-qualified candidates);
Brief of Amicus Curiae Society for Human Resources Management in Support of Petitioner,
6, US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391 (2002) (No. 00-1250) (noting that requiring an
employer to reassign a qualified, disabled employee to a vacant position gives a disabled
employee an unfair “advantage” over others in the workforce); supra notes 74, 83, 85–86
(noting that cases such as Huber, Humiston-Keeling, Burns, Dalton, Terrell, Daugherty, Kellogg,
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Tenth Circuit is ill-founded and overly burdensome on employers and
on non-disabled individuals, and next examines why the alternate
approach—adopted by the Seventh and Eighth Circuits—fits squarely
within congressional intent and is therefore more appropriate.101
More particularly, Part III.A discusses why a plain reading of the
text of the ADA shows that an employer is not required to reassign a
disabled employee, who is unable to perform his current job, to a vacant
position if doing so requires it to violate its established policy of hiring
the most-qualified candidate.102
Second, Part III.B explores how
legislative history supports that view.103 Finally, Part III.C initially
illustrates why the Tenth Circuit’s approach to interpreting the ADA as
requiring reassignment of qualified, disabled employees is impractical
for employers and overly burdensome on non-disabled individuals, and
then summarizes why the alternate approach of the Seventh and Eighth
Circuits is more appropriate and practical.104
A. The Tenth Circuit Misinterpreted the ADA’s Text: An Employer Is Not
Required to Reassign a Qualified, Disabled Employee to a Vacant Position
over a More-Qualified Candidate
Contrary to the Tenth Circuit’s position on reassignment, an
employer is not required to reassign a qualified, disabled employee, who
is unable to perform his existing job, if doing so requires that it violate its
non-discriminatory, merit-based hiring policy.105 First, although the
Cravens, and Turco have determined that the ADA was not intended to mandate affirmative
action, mandate preferential treatment, or require reassignment of qualified, disabled
employees to vacant positions), and, in particular, note 86 (noting that the court in
Humiston-Keeling stated that requiring employers to violate their qualification-based hiring
policies in order to reassign disabled employees to vacant positions because of the
employees’ disabilities is “affirmative action with a vengeance[]”).
101
See infra Part III (examining why the Tenth Circuit’s view of the ADA’s reassignment
provision—that an employer must reassign a qualified, disabled employee to a vacant
position over a more-qualified candidate—is incongruent with the ADA’s text and history
and unduly burdens employers and non-disabled individuals).
102
See infra Part III.A (analyzing the ADA, and explaining why the Act does not require
an employer to ignore its non-discriminatory merit-based hiring policy in favor of
reassigning a qualified, disabled employee).
103
See infra Part III.B (discussing how the ADA’s legislative history demonstrates that
Congress did not intend for the ADA to require an employer to forego its nondiscriminatory policy of hiring the best candidate in favor of reassigning a qualified,
disabled employee who is unable to perform his assigned job).
104
See infra Part III.C (arguing that the Tenth Circuit’s approach to reassigning a
qualified, disabled employee fails to appropriately balance public policy concerns, and that
the Seventh and Eighth Circuit’s approach strikes the proper balance of these concerns).
105
See infra Part III.A (explaining how the Tenth Circuit’s interpretation of the ADA’s
reassignment provision conflicts with the ADA).
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ADA’s core goal is eliminating discrimination against disabled
individuals and the reasonable accommodation provision requires that
employers treat disabled individuals differently than non-disabled
individuals (often resulting in preferential treatment to the disabled), the
ADA does not require that the disabled be given special preference over
the non-disabled.106 Second, the ADA merely lists reassignment as a
possible reasonable accommodation, not a requirement.107 The ADA’s
text is explored in greater detail in the following three paragraphs.108
First, the ADA states in plain terms that its purpose is to eliminate
discrimination against people with disabilities—not to give special
preference to disabled people at the expense of non-disabled people.109
To comply with the ADA, an employer must do more than simply
refrain from making an adverse employment decision based on a
person’s disability.110
An employer must provide reasonable
accommodation when such accommodation would enable a disabled
person to perform the job.111 Moreover, when an employer fails to
provide reasonable accommodation to an individual, the employer
106
See infra Part III.A (discussing that the ADA’s purpose is eradicating unfair
discrimination against disabled people, not promoting affirmative action-like practices that
favor people with disabilities).
107
See infra Part III.A (explaining that reassignment of a qualified, disabled employee
unable to perform his current job to a vacant position is a possible reasonable
accommodation but will not always be reasonable).
108
See infra Part III.A (explaining that the ADA’s purpose is to eliminate discrimination
against disabled individuals, not to afford special preference to them over non-disabled
individuals, and explaining that the ADA merely lists reassignment as an example of a
possible reasonable accommodation, not a requirement).
109
See supra note 40 (quoting the four-prong purpose of the ADA, and noting that three
of the four provisions discussing the purpose of the ADA expressly mention the
importance of addressing disability discrimination).
110
See EEOC Enforcement Guidance (2002) (explaining that reasonable accommodation
was necessarily incorporated into the ADA because of the nature of disability
discrimination, such as unwillingness of employers to modify workspace configurations);
supra note 42 (quoting relevant provisions of the ADA, and noting an employer’s obligation
to provide reasonable accommodation). See also Stephen F. Befort & Tracey Holmes
Donesky, Reassignment Under the Americans With Disabilities Act: Reasonable Accommodation,
Affirmative Action, or Both?, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1045, 1047–49 (2000). Because of the
nature of disabilities, the ADA requires more of businesses and employers than traditional
anti-discrimination laws require. Id.
111
See supra note 42 (quoting the ADA’s reasonable accommodation provision, and
indicating that an employer has an obligation to provide reasonable accommodation to a
qualified, disabled individual). See also Befort & Donesky, supra note 110, at 1047–49. An
employer must do more than avoid overt discrimination to comply with the ADA. Id. If,
for example, the only thing preventing a disabled employee from performing a job is a
slight adjustment to a work environment, then the employer may be required to make the
adjustment, so long as it is reasonable and does not present an undue hardship on the
employer. Id.
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discriminates against that individual unless the employer demonstrates
that an accommodation poses an undue hardship.112 In other words, the
ADA serves to ensure that an employer does not avoid hiring a disabled
person merely because the employer would have to provide
accommodation.113 Thus, the ADA’s text emphasizes that an employer
has a duty to make decisions free from discrimination, but the text makes
no mention of a duty to make decisions with preference in mind.114
Second, the ADA lists reassignment as a possible reasonable
accommodation, not a requirement, which further supports the notion
that an employer is not required, in all circumstances, to automatically
reassign a qualified, disabled employee to a vacant position.115 The
ADA’s reasonable accommodation provision lists eight types of

See supra note 42 (quoting the ADA’s reasonable accommodation and undue hardship
provisions, and explaining that an employer engages in discrimination pursuant to the
ADA by not providing reasonable accommodation to a qualified, disabled individual). See
also Befort & Donesky, supra note 110, at 1090. Befort and Donesky describe undue
hardship as an “escape valve” that relieves an employer of his duty to provide reasonable
accommodation to a disabled individual. Id. To keep an employer’s accommodation duty
from becoming too burdensome, the undue hardship clause serves to limit the kind of
action required by an employer. Id.
113
See supra note 42 and accompanying text (discussing the scope of conduct considered
discriminatory according to § 12112(b)(5)(A)); infra note 131 (quoting the legislative record
in which Congress stated that an employer may not disqualify a disabled person as a way
of shirking its duty to provide reasonable accommodation).
114
See Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154, 1181 (10th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (Kelly,
J., filed an opinion, concurring in part and dissenting in part, and Baldock and Brorby, J.J.,
joined). To the extent that eliminating discrimination against disabled individuals assures
access to equal opportunities, equality hopefully results. Id. However, the ADA does not
guarantee equal results. Id. The ADA requires that equal consideration be given, without
regard to disability, to a disabled individual who competes for a job; it does not guarantee
that the job be given to the disabled individual. Id. Congress intended to create “a level
playing field[,]” not to mandate results. Id. at 1185. See also 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, App. (2000)
(stating that the ADA seeks to attain access to equal opportunities “based on merit[]”)
(emphasis added). See also Brief of Amicus Curiae Society for Human Resources
Management in Support of Petitioner, 3, US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391 (2002)
(No. 00-1250). The ADA does not call for quotas or special preference favoring disabled
individuals. Id. To be sure, assuring equality of treatment for people with disabilities is
not the same thing as affording special preference to ensure that equality results. Id. See
also supra note 40 (quoting the ADA’s purpose of eliminating discrimination); supra notes
74, 83, 85–86 (indicating that Huber, Humiston-Keeling, Burns, Terrell, Daugherty, Cravens,
and Turco hold that the ADA emphasizes eliminating discrimination, not mandating
affirmative action); supra notes 23, 32 (referring to statements by President George H. Bush,
noting that the focus of the ADA is on eradicating discrimination). But see Midland Brake,
180 F.3d at 1168 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(8)) (suggesting that a primary purpose of the
ADA is to assure equality for disabled individuals).
115
Supra note 40 (quoting § 12111(9), the ADA’s reasonable accommodation provision);
infra notes 116–21, 122–27 and accompanying text (explaining that reassignment may be a
possible accommodation, not a requirement).
112
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accommodation that might fit within the term “reasonable
accommodation[,]” and significantly, the provision states, “‘reasonable
accommodation’ may include[.]”116 The term “may” indicates that the
subsequent list provides eight examples of accommodation that could be
reasonable.117 The provision does not set forth accommodations that are
mandatory in every situation.118 If Congress intended for eight types of
accommodation to be mandatory, it would have used language
indicating such a requirement.119 For example, the section discussing
discrimination states, “No covered entity shall discriminate . . . .”120
Because different terms—“may” and “shall”—are employed throughout
the Act, different meanings must be inferred from each term.121
In sharp contrast, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals determined
that the term “may” was used to introduce the list of nonexclusive
See supra note 40 (quoting § 12111(9), the ADA’s reasonable accommodation
provision).
117
Midland Brake, 180 F.3d at 1181 (Kelly, J., filed an opinion, concurring in part and
dissenting in part, and Baldock and Brorby, J.J., joined) (noting that the measures listed in
the reasonable accommodation provision are examples of reasonable accommodation);
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1407 (8th ed. 2004) (defining “may” as meaning, “[t]o be
permitted to . . . To be a possibility[.]”); supra note 40 (quoting § 12111(9), the ADA’s
reasonable accommodation provision); infra note 122 (quoting the majority opinion in
Midland Brake, noting that the listed accommodations are only examples of possible
accommodations).
118
See Midland Brake, 180 F.3d at 1184 (Kelly, J., filed an opinion, concurring in part and
dissenting in part, and Baldock and Brorby, J.J., joined) (“‘[M]ay include reassignment to a
vacant position’ cannot mean ‘shall include reassignment to a vacant position.’”) (emphasis
added); supra note 42 (quoting § 12111(9), the ADA’s reasonable accommodation
provision); infra note 122 (quoting the majority opinion in Midland Brake, noting that the
accommodations listed are examples of accommodations that may or may not be
appropriate in all instances).
119
See Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 140 (1994) (indicating that where different
terms are used within a statute, it should be presumed that Congress intended the words to
have different meaning); Midland Brake, 180 F.3d at 1181 (Kelly, J., filed an opinion,
concurring in part and dissenting in part, and Baldock and Brorby, J.J., joined) (“Courts
must resist the temptation to ‘improve’ upon Congress’s work.”); supra note 42 text (noting
the use of the word “may” within the ADA); infra note 120 (noting the use of the word
“shall” within the ADA).
120
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2000) (emphasis added)
(“No covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability
because of the disability of such individual in regard to job application procedures, the
hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and
other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.”); see also BLACK’S, supra note 117, at
1407 (defining “shall” as meaning, “[h]as a duty to; more broadly, is required to . . . ”).
121
See, e.g., Ratzlaf, 510 U.S. at 140 (requiring different meaning to be assigned to differing
terms used throughout the statute); supra note 42 (quoting § 12111(9), the ADA’s reasonable
accommodation provision, which employs the term “may”); supra note 117 (defining
“may”); supra note 120 (quoting § 12112(a), which employs the term “shall[,]” and defining
“shall”).
116
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accommodations because not every listed accommodation would be
appropriate in every circumstance.122 However, in its one sentence
explanation, the court admitted that the circumstances of the situation
must be considered and that not all accommodations will be appropriate
in every case.123 This acknowledgement actually works against the
court’s position that Congress intended reassignment to be required.124
More significantly, it works against the court’s specific contention that an
employer must reassign a disabled employee to a vacant position, even
when doing so means that it must violate its policy of hiring the bestqualified candidate.125 As the Tenth Circuit conceded, the facts and
circumstances of a situation must be considered.126 Thus, pursuant to the
Midland Brake, 180 F.3d at 1168 n.7. The majority stated:
The dissent argues that our interpretation of the ADA would read out
the words “may include” that precede the nonexclusive list of
examples of reasonable accommodations found in 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9).
Our interpretation does nothing of the sort. The words “may include”
precede the nonexclusive list of examples of reasonable accommodation
precisely because the list is nonexclusive and various accommodations may or
may not be appropriate depending upon the disability and other circumstances
of employment.
Id. (emphasis added). The court argues that the word “may” does not prevent the
provision from requiring mandatory reassignment. Id. See also Brief for Respondent, 33,
US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391 (2002) (No. 00-1250) (arguing that Congress must
have intended for the ADA to require an employer to reassign a qualified, disabled
employee to a vacant position because it added reassignment language into the ADA that
did not previously exist in the Rehabilitation Act); supra note 95 (discussing that the
majority in Midland Brake also emphasized that the ADA does not employ the phrase
“consideration of a reassignment to a vacant position”).
123
See Midland Brake, 180 F.3d at 1168 n.7; supra note 122 (quoting, in italics, the court’s
one-sentence argument, suggesting that an accommodation must be considered in the
totality of the circumstances).
124
See supra note 122 (quoting the court’s one-sentence argument, and noting in the
italicized portion of the quote that not all of the accommodations listed are required in
every case).
125
Compare supra note 122 (quoting the court’s one-sentence argument from Midland
Brake, noting the italicized portion of quote), with Midland Brake, 180 F.3d at 1167–68
(determining that an employer is required to reassign a qualified, disabled employee
unable to perform his assigned job to a vacant position, even if it has a policy of hiring the
best-qualified candidate and the disabled employee is not the most-qualified candidate).
126
See also Midland Brake, 180 F.3d at 1180–81 (Kelly, J., filed an opinion, concurring in
part and dissenting in part, and Baldock and Brorby, J.J., joined) (explaining that the
examples listed in the reasonable accommodation provision are not mandatory in every
situation); supra note 122 (quoting the court’s one-sentence argument in italics). Thus,
reassignment may be appropriate in certain situations; however, it may be inappropriate in
others, such as when it requires an employer to breach its well-established hiring policy
and turn away a more-qualified individual. Supra note 122; supra note 74 (discussing
Huber, Humiston-Keeling, and Burns, recognizing that an employer may be required to
reassign a disabled employee in certain situations, but holding that an employer is not
required to violate its legitimate, qualification-based hiring policy to do so). But see supra
122
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ADA, an employer is not required to reassign a qualified, disabled
employee, who is unable to perform his current job, to a vacant position
in violation of its non-discriminatory policy of hiring the most-qualified
candidate for the job.127 Indeed, the legislative history of the ADA
supports this textual view and is discussed next in Part III.B.128
B. The Tenth Circuit Misinterpreted the ADA’s Legislative History: An
Employer is Not Required to Reassign a Qualified, Disabled Employee to a
Vacant Position over a More-Qualified Candidate
The ADA’s legislative history provides a glimpse into congressional
intent concerning the ADA’s goals.129 Two references in the legislative
record are particularly relevant and show that Congress did not intend
for an employer to be required to reassign a disabled employee to a
vacant position.130 In the first reference, Congress noted that if a
disabled individual is able to perform the essential functions of his or her
job, with or without reasonable accommodation, an employer may not
disqualify the employee because of the disability.131 On the other hand,
notes 90–91, 96 (discussing the majority’s view in Midland Brake—that an employer may not
assert a hiring policy as a reason for not reassigning a qualified, disabled employee to a
vacant position).
127
See supra note 42 (quoting the ADA’s reasonable accommodation provision); note 74
(discussing Huber, Humiston-Keeling, and Burns, in which the court held that an employer is
not always required to reassign a qualified, disabled employee to a vacant position). But
see John E. Murray & Christopher J. Murray, Enabling the Disabled: Reassignment and the
ADA, 83 MARQ. L. REV. 721, 742 (2000) (arguing that requiring a qualified, disabled
employee unable to perform his assigned job to compete for a vacant position “eviscerates”
the ADA’s reassignment provision); supra note 75 (discussing the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission’s interpretation of the ADA’s reassignment provision—that an
employer is required to reassign to a vacant position a qualified, disabled employee unable
to perform his assigned job because of his disability and that an employer must not require
such employee to compete with other applicants because reassignment means that he is
automatically reassigned to a vacant position).
128
See infra Part III.B (examining the ADA’s legislative history, which demonstrates that
an employer is not required to reassign to a vacant position a qualified, disabled employee
unable to perform his assigned position).
129
See infra notes 123–46 and accompanying text (discussing how the legislative history
shows that Congress did not intend for the ADA to require an employer to reassign a
qualified, disabled employee to a vacant position).
130
See infra notes 131, 134 (quoting references to the legislative history).
131
H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 55–56 (1990), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 337–
38. The Committee stated:
[T]he Committee intends to reaffirm that this legislation does not
undermine an employer’s ability to choose and maintain qualified
workers. This legislation simply provides that employment decisions
must not have the purpose or effect of subjecting a qualified individual
with a disability to discrimination on the basis of his or her disability.
Thus, under this legislation an employer is still free to select
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“[an] employer has no obligation under this legislation to prefer
applicants with disabilities over other applicants on the basis of
disability.”132 Thus, legislative history indicates that an employer is not
required to reassign a disabled employee to a vacant position, and an
employer is certainly not required to do so in violation of its legitimate
policy of hiring the most-qualified applicant.133
In another instance, the legislative record likewise supports the
concept that reassignment of a qualified, disabled employee to a vacant
position is not mandated by the ADA.134 In discussing reassignment as a
applicants for reasons unrelated to the existence or consequence of a
disability. For example, suppose an employer has an opening for a
typist and two persons apply for the job, one being an individual with
a disability who types 50 words per minute and the other being an
individual who types 75 words per minute. The employer is permitted
to choose the applicant with the higher typing speed, if typing speed is
necessary for successful performance on the job.
On the other hand, if the two applicants are an individual with a
hearing impairment who requires a telephone headset with an
amplifier and an individual without a disability, both of whom have
the same typing speed, the employer is not permitted to choose the
individual without a disability because of the need to provide the
needed reasonable accommodation to the person with the disability.
In the above example, the employer would be permitted to reject
the applicant with a disability and choose the other applicant for
reasons not related to the disability or to the accommodation or
otherwise not prohibited by this legislation. In other words, the
employer’s obligation is to consider applicants and make decisions
without regard to an individual’s disability, or the individual’s need
for a reasonable accommodation. But, the employer has no obligation
under this legislation to prefer applicants with disabilities over other
applicants on the basis of disability.
Midland Brake, 180 F.3d at 1182, 1181 n.1 (Kelly, J., filed an opinion, concurring in part and
dissenting in part, and Baldock and Brorby, J.J., joined) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt.
2, at 55–56 (1990), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 337–38) (indicating that requiring
preferences conflicts with Congress’s “clear statement[]”).
132
See supra note 131 (quoting the legislative history, specifically noting in the last
sentence of the quoted material that an employer does not have to show preference to a
disabled applicant over non-disabled applicants).
133
See supra note 131 (quoting the legislative history, in particular, the last sentence in
which the Committee stated that an employer is not required to afford preference to
applicants with disabilities).
134
See H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 63 (1990), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 345.
The Committee stated:
Reasonable accommodation may also include reassignment to a vacant
position. If an employee, because of disability, can no longer perform
the essential functions of the job that she or he has held, a transfer to
another vacant job for which the person is qualified may prevent the
employee from being out of work and [the] employer from losing a
valuable worker. Efforts should be made, however, to accommodate
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reasonable accommodation, Congress indicated that this should be a last
resort and should be contemplated only after it becomes apparent that
accommodating the person in his existing job is not possible.135 Because
Congress described the duty to reassign as one that should be
considered, not required, and not as the preferred accommodation, but
merely an option, the legislative history shows that the ADA may
require an employer to consider reassignment, but does not mandate that
an employer ignore its qualification-based hiring policy in order to
reassign a disabled employee to a vacant position.136
Despite these excerpts from the record, the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals concluded that Congress intended to require an employer to
reassign a disabled employee and turned to the same legislative history
to support its contention.137 In Midland Brake, the majority claimed that
when Congress said an employer is not required to give a disabled
individual preferential treatment in the hiring process, Congress was
referring specifically to qualified, disabled applicants and not qualified,
disabled employees.138 Furthermore, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
an employee in the position that he or she was hired to fill before
reassignment is considered. The Committee also wishes to make clear
the reassignment need only be to a vacant position-“bumping” another
employee out of a position to create a vacancy is not required.
Id. (emphasis added); see also Midland Brake, 180 F.3d at 1184 & n.3 (Kelly, J., filed an
opinion, concurring in part and dissenting in part, and Baldock and Brorby, J.J., joined)
(quoting H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 63 (1990), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 345)
(arguing that the legislative record shows that Congress intended for reassignment to be
considered, not required).
135
See supra note 134 (quoting the legislative history, noting that efforts should be made
to accommodate the individual in his current job before reassignment is considered, and
referencing the dissenting opinion in Midland Brake, which states that an employer has a
duty only to consider reassignment).
136
See supra note 134 (quoting the legislative history in which Congress noted that an
employer has a duty only to consider reassignment, and noting that the dissent’s view in
Midland Brake supports this interpretation).
137
Midland Brake, 180 F.3d at 1168 & n.8 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 55–56
(1990), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 337–38; H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 63 (1990), as
reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 345); see also supra notes 131, 134 (quoting the legislative
history to which the majority in Midland Brake referred).
138
180 F.3d at 1168 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 62–65 (1990), as reprinted in
1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 344–46). In response to the dissent’s interpretation of the legislative
record, the majority reasoned:
We have no quarrel with the proposition that an employer, when
confronted with two initial job applicants for a typing position, one of
whom types 50 words a minute while the other types 75 words a
minute, may hire the person with the higher typing speed,
notwithstanding the fact that the slower typist has a disability.
However, the legislative record clearly distinguishes between the
affirmative action of modifying the essential functions of a job (which
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maintained that Congress intended for employers to do more than
merely consider reassignment.139 The court’s contention fails, however,
because it is misplaced.140 Although the terms “reassignment” and
“assign” apply to incumbents, for the reasons explained in the preceding
two paragraphs, reassigning a disabled employee is still merely an
option, not a requirement.141
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals additionally turned to the
portion of the legislative record in which Congress noted that
reassignment could provide a means of keeping a disabled worker
employed.142 However, this reasoning fails for the same reason:
is not required) and the duty to reassign a disabled person to an
existing vacant job, if necessary to enable the disabled person to keep
his or her employment with the company (which is required).
Id.
Id. at 1164. The majority rejected the dissent’s interpretation that an employer need
only consider reassigning a qualified, disabled employee unable to perform his assigned
position to a vacant position. Id. The majority turned to the statutory text and stated, “We
reject this narrow definition of reassignment, both because it does violence to the literal
meaning of reassignment and because it would render the reassignment language in 42
U.S.C. § 12111(9) a nullity.” Id. at 1164, 1165. To support its argument, the court discussed
the fact that the term “reassignment” necessarily refers to an incumbent, not an outside
applicant, and the core term “assign” likewise implies that an employer is required to take
specific action. Id. at 1164. The majority determined that the dissenting opinion incorrectly
asserted that the duty of an employer is merely to consider reassignment. Id. The majority
concluded:
First as to the literal language, the ADA defines the term “reasonable
accommodation” to include “reassignment to a vacant position.” The
statute does not say “consideration of a reassignment to a vacant
position.” Moreover, “reassignment” must mean something more than
the mere opportunity to apply for a job with the rest of the world.
Id. at 1164; see also supra note 95 (discussing the majority’s interpretation of “reassignment”
and “assign”).
140
See infra note 141 and accompanying text (explaining why Midland Brake is incorrect).
141
See supra note 95 (discussing Midland Brake’s interpretation of “reassignment” and
“assign”); supra notes 105–36 and accompanying text (explaining that the majority’s view in
Midland Brake is incorrect for the following reasons: (1) the phrase “reasonable
accommodation” in the ADA’s reassignment provision is followed by the phrase “may
include[,]” and the use of the term “may” preceding reassignment means that Congress
intended for it to be an option, not a mandate; (2) in the majority’s own words, a request for
accommodation must be considered in view of the circumstances; (3) Congress stated that
hiring decisions should be made without considering whether an employee is disabled and
made no reference to giving preference to a disabled employee over non-disabled
applicants; and (4) the legislative record shows that an employer may be required to
consider reassigning a qualified, disabled employee unable to perform his assigned job to a
vacant position but is not required to do so in every situation); supra notes 130–36
(explaining why reassignment is an option—not a requirement).
142
Midland Brake, 180 F.3d at 1161–62 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 63 (1990), as
reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 345); see also supra note 134 (quoting the legislative
history, in which Congress acknowledged that reassigning a qualified, disabled employee
139
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reassignment may be appropriate in certain situations, and in those cases
reassignment will keep a disabled worker employed.143 Nevertheless, as
discussed previously, in situations where reassignment is not reasonable
or poses an undue hardship, it is not required.144 Congress merely noted
that reassignment to a vacant position might keep a disabled employee
from being unemployed, not that reassignment would be appropriate in
every situation.145 Therefore, the legislative record supports the view
that the ADA does not require an employer to forego its legitimate hiring
policy and reassign a qualified, disabled employee at the expense of a
more-qualified candidate.146
The impracticality of mandatory
reassignment also supports this proposition and is discussed next.147
C. The Tenth Circuit’s Approach Unduly Burdens Employers and NonDisabled Individuals: The ADA Should Not Be Interpreted to Require an
Employer to Reassign a Qualified, Disabled Employee to a Vacant Position
over a More-Qualified Candidate
Not only is the Tenth Circuit’s approach to reassignment ill-founded,
it is also impractical because it unduly burdens employers and nondisabled individuals.148 According to the Tenth Circuit, even if an
unable to perform his assigned job to a vacant position could enable a disabled employee to
remain employed).
143
See supra Part III.A (explaining that whether an accommodation is reasonable depends
on the situation).
144
29 C.F.R. § 1630.1(c)(2)(2000); EEOC Enforcement Guidance (2002); supra note 42
(referencing the ADA’s reasonable accommodation and undue hardship provisions); see
also supra notes 130–36 (explaining why reassignment is an option, not a requirement);
supra 141 and accompanying text (summarizing why the majority’s view in Midland Brake is
incorrect).
145
See supra note 134 (quoting the legislative history, in which Congress acknowledged
that reassigning a disabled employee unable to perform his assigned job to a vacant
position could keep a disabled worker employed).
146
See supra notes 129–45 and accompanying text (explaining that reassigning a qualified,
disabled employee to a vacant position is an option that an employer may exercise to
prevent losing a valuable employee).
147
See infra Part III.C (reviewing the inappropriateness of requiring an employer to
reassign a qualified, disabled employee unable to perform his assigned job to a vacant
position over a more-qualified candidate).
148
See Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154, 1185 (10th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (Kelly,
J., filed an opinion, concurring in part and dissenting in part, and Baldock and Brorby, J.J.,
joined) (noting that the majority view, requiring reassignment of a qualified, disabled
employee unable to perform his assigned job over a more-qualified candidate, presents an
unreasonable burden on employers); Brief Amici Curiae of the Equal Employment
Advisory Council and the Employers Group in Support of Petitioner, 18, US Airways, Inc.
v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391 (2002) (No. 00-1250) (arguing that requiring reassignment to a
vacant position of qualified, disabled employees unduly burdens employers); Brief of
Amicus Curiae Society for Human Resources Management in Support of Petitioner, 3, US
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employer has an established, non-discriminatory policy of reviewing
employees’ qualifications and selecting the most-qualified candidate for
a vacancy, it must forego such a policy in favor of hiring a minimally
qualified, but disabled, employee, unless it shows that foregoing its
policy presents an undue hardship.149 Such an approach places excessive
burdens on employers and on non-disabled individuals.150
First, when an employer is forced to turn away employees or
external candidates who possess more experience in favor of hiring the
less-qualified, disabled employee, the employer initially suffers in a very
basic way—by being required to maintain a minimally qualified
employee and, thus, potentially, a minimally qualified workforce.151
Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391 (2002) (No. 00-1250) (stating that requiring employers
to pass over more-qualified employees in favor of selecting disabled employees for
vacancies is “unreasonable on its face[]”); Thomas F. O’Neil III & Kenneth M. Reiss,
Reassigning Disabled Employees Under the ADA: Preferences Under the Guise of Equality?, 17
LAB. LAW. 347, 360 (2001) (“Requiring an employer to select a less-qualified disabled
employee is an accommodation that is unreasonable on its face.”); supra note 83 and
accompanying text (discussing the view that the Huber court expressed in relying on the
majority’s view in Humiston-Keeling—that requiring an employer to reassign a qualified,
disabled employee unable to perform his assigned job to a vacant position, merely because
he is disabled and minimally qualified, unreasonably burdens employers).
149
Midland Brake, 180 F.3d at 1167–68; see also supra note 75 (discussing the EEOC’s
interpretation of the ADA’s reasonable accommodation provision—that a qualified,
disabled employee unable to perform his assigned job is entitled to an automatic transfer to
a vacant position). But see supra note 83 (noting that both Huber and Humiston-Keeling held
that the ADA allows decisions to be made based on merit).
150
See Midland Brake, 180 F.3d at 1184 & n.3 (Kelly, J., filed an opinion, concurring in part
and dissenting in part, and Baldock and Brorby, J.J., joined) (suggesting that the majority’s
opinion—placing a duty on an employer to reassign a disabled worker even if a morequalified employee exists—will either result in more lawsuits because of the uncertainty it
fosters, or fewer lawsuits because employers may simply err on the side of caution and
reassign disabled employees unable to perform their assigned jobs to vacant positions over
more-qualified candidates to avoid charges of disability discrimination); Brief Amici Curiae
of the Equal Employment Advisory Council, 535 U.S. 391 at 18 (stating that requiring an
employer to make an exception to its policy of hiring the most-qualified candidate and to
offer a vacant position to a less-qualified, but disabled, employee places an employer in an
“untenable” position); Brief of Amicus Curiae Society for Human Resources Management,
535 U.S. 391, at 11 (explaining that requiring an employer to violate its policies creates an
unmanageable dilemma for human resources professionals); infra notes 151–69 and
accompanying text (discussion).
151
See Midland Brake, 180 F.3d at 1181–82 (Kelly, J., filed an opinion, concurring in part
and dissenting in part, and Baldock and Brorby, J.J., joined) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 101-485,
pt. 2, at 55–56 (1990), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 337–38) (stating that requiring an
employer to reassign a minimally qualified, disabled employee unable to perform his
assigned position to a vacant position over a more-qualified employee ignores Congress’s
statement); O’Neil III & Reiss, supra note 148, at 347 (noting the long-term business
consequences of selecting candidates who are minimally qualified but not the bestqualified, these authors argue that an employer should never be forced to turn away a
more-qualified candidate in favor of hiring a disabled employee); supra note 131 (quoting
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Second, an employer’s decision to reject more-qualified employees
negatively affects employee-management relations, and the EEOC’s
guideline requiring an employer to maintain confidentiality concerning
employees’ disabilities compounds that negative impact.152 To illustrate,
if an employer discloses to non-disabled employees that they were not
selected despite their greater seniority and experience, records of high
performance, and other qualifications because the selected employee was
disabled, the employer risks breaching the ADA’s confidentiality
requirement.153 On the other hand, not explaining to non-disabled
employees why they were not selected can be detrimental to employee
morale and can lead to lost productivity and increased turnover.154
the legislative history, noting in the first quoted sentence that Congress did not intend for
the ADA to undercut an employer’s ability to maintain a qualified workforce).
152
See EEOC Enforcement Guidance (2002), supra note 9. Concerning an employer’s duty
to maintain confidential information related to a disabled employee’s disability, the EEOC
Enforcement Guidance states:
May an employer tell other employees that an individual is receiving
reasonable accommodation when employees ask questions about a
coworker with a disability?
No. An employer may not disclose that an employee is receiving
a reasonable accommodation because this usually amounts to a
disclosure that the individual has a disability. The ADA specifically
prohibits the disclosure of medical information except in certain
limited situations, which do not include disclosure to coworkers.
An employer may certainly respond to a question from an
employee about why a coworker is receiving what is perceived as
“different” or “special” treatment by emphasizing its policy of
assisting any employee who encounters difficulties in the workplace.
The employer also may find it helpful to point out that many of the
workplace issues encountered by employees are personal, and that, in
these circumstances, it is the employer’s policy to respect employee
privacy.
Id. at No. 42 (citing Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(3)(B),
(d)(4)(C) (1997)) (internal footnote omitted). See also Brief of Amicus Curiae Society for
Human Resources Management, 535 U.S. 391, at 8. When a disabled employee’s disability
is not visible or obvious, it can be especially problematic for employers when forced to
select the disabled employee over a more-qualified worker. Id. Non-selected employees
may not realize that the employer’s hand was forced, and the ADA’s confidentiality
requirement inhibits an employer from explaining why the disabled, less-qualified
employee was chosen. Id. at 8–9. See also Alex B. Long, The ADA’s Reasonable
Accommodation Requirement and “Innocent Third Parties,” 68 MO. L. REV. 863, 911 (2003)
(discussing disruptive effects, such as decreased productivity, that poor management
decisions can have in the workplace).
153
See supra note 152 (quoting the EEOC’s Enforcement Guidance and explaining how
the ADA’s confidentiality requirement limits what an employer can communicate to
candidates not selected for a position).
154
See Brief of Amicus Curiae Society for Human Resources Management, 535 U.S. 391, at
8–9. The non-selected employees are likely to conclude that the decision was arbitrary and
capricious, in violation of the employer’s policy, or, worse, discriminatory. Id. Some may
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Forcing an employer to violate its established policies and preventing the
same employer from communicating the reasoning behind its decision to
those individuals affected inhibits the employer’s ability to mitigate
damage to employee-management relations.155
Third, requiring an employer to reject a highly qualified employee
and instead select a minimally qualified, disabled worker exposes the
employer to legal liability.156 If any non-selected individual is a member
of a class protected by federal, state, or local law—such as race, religion,
gender, or national origin—he may file a charge or initiate a lawsuit,
alleging discriminatory treatment.157
Thus, even if the ADA’s
confidentiality requirement allowed an employer to communicate its
reasoning for selecting a disabled employee over a non-disabled
individual and such would be a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason,
the employer still would not be able to eliminate charges of
discrimination by non-selected individuals.158 Requiring an employer to
choose between being accused of disability discrimination and being

decide to resign and accept alternate positions elsewhere either because of ill-feelings
toward the employer or simply because of a desire for more money or a more challenging
position, which they would have received if they had not been rejected from the position
they sought. See id. The impact on employee-management relations and on employment
staffing levels is significant. See id. See also supra note 152 and accompanying text
(discussing the ADA’s confidentiality requirement and how it can affect employeemanagement relations).
155
Supra note 154 and accompanying text.
156
See infra notes 157–59 and accompanying text (discussing how requiring an employer
to reject a qualified candidate in favor of choosing a less-qualified, but disabled employee,
subjects an employer to legal liability).
157
See, e.g., Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2000). Title VII
prohibits discrimination in employment based on race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin. Id. § 2000e-2 (2000). In addition, if any non-selected employee has previously
complained pursuant to Title VII or assisted with another employee’s Title VII complaint,
he may file a charge with the EEOC, alleging retaliatory treatment. Id. § 2000e-3 (2000). See
also, e.g., Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 126 S. Ct. 2405, 2411–16 (2006). In
Burlington, the Court clarified that an employee who is not a member of any protected class
has a Title VII claim if he can show that his employer retaliated against him for opposing
any practice forbidden by Title VII. Id. An employee may show any type of retaliatory
action by the employer, whether taken in the workplace or away from the workplace, that
caused material harm to the same employee, i.e., the harm would have dissuaded a
reasonable employee from making or supporting a Title VII claim. Id. at 2411–18. But see
Befort & Donesky, supra note 110, at 1089 (arguing that a non-disabled employee lacks
standing to sue under the ADA when the employer chooses a disabled employee for a
vacant job).
158
See supra note 157 and accompanying text (discussing that any individual not selected
for a vacant position may file a charge of discrimination, and such action is particularly
likely when that same individual is more-qualified than the chosen employee).
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accused of discrimination on another basis is unduly burdensome on
employers.159
Fourth, in addition to being impractical for an employer, the Tenth
Circuit’s approach forces non-disabled individuals to bear an undue
burden.160 According to the Tenth Circuit, an employee who possesses
159
Brief of Amicus Curiae Society for Human Resources Management, 535 U.S. 391, at 4,
9, 10. Moving the focus of the hiring decision away from merit, in essence, requires an
employer to “choose between two potential lawsuits.” Id. at 9. An employer may be forced
to choose between hiring a disabled employee unable to perform his assigned job and a
more-qualified, non-disabled individual who is a member of another protected class. Id.
Alternatively,
Suppose two employees with medical impairments apply for a
transfer. Which one should the employer choose? Either employee
could be a “person with a disability” under the Act, but it is also
possible that neither one is. Under the EEOC’s . . . approach, the
employer faces a Hobson’s choice. If the employer awards the position
to one of the employees as an accommodation, the other may sue and
claim that the first employee has no disability. Under the ADA’s
confidentiality requirements, the rejected employee may not even learn
about the accommodation aspects of the selection until after litigation
ensues. In the worst case scenario, a court will be forced to choose
between two disabled employees, and the employer will be forced to
suffer the costs of litigation.
Id. at 9–10. See also K. Tia Burke, Violence in the Workplace: Why Employers Are Caught in the
Middle, 21 PA. LAW. 18, 18 (1999) (describing the tension that exists when an employer’s
responsibility to protect others and the rights of a mentally ill employee converge); Jennifer
J. Hamilton & Anne N. Walker, Walking the ADA Tightrope Between Being Too Careful and Not
Careful Enough, 7 No.5 CONN. EMP. L. LETTER 2 (1999) (discussing the connection between
workplace violence and certain categories of mental illness); Georgia A. Staton & Greg J.
Thompson, A Practical Perspective on Employee Violence and the Americans With Disabilities
Act, 35 ARIZ. ATT’Y 32, 32 (1999) (posing an employer’s dilemma of wanting to screen out
applicants who display violent tendencies for certain positions but being unable to do so
within the confines of the ADA). See also Burke, supra, at 18 (explaining that a third party
could bring a negligent hiring claim against an employer for injuries resulting from
problems associated with a minimally qualified employee—problems that could have been
avoided by hiring a more-qualified person); Hamilton & Walker, supra (same); Staton &
Thompson, supra, at 32 (same). See also Matthew J. Heller, A review of the 10 legal
decisions of 2007 that will have the greatest impact on the workplace in the coming year
and beyond., WORKFORCE MGMT., Dec. 10, 2007, at § NEWS, Part 2 of 2, at 33. Heller
summarizes a case decided in 2007 by the Ninth Circuit, holding that where an employee
shows a causal connection between her disability-produced conduct—in this case a violent
outburst—and an adverse employment action that she suffered, a jury must be told that it
may find that the employer’s action constituted disability discrimination. Id. The author
also discussed a separate case decided in 2006 in which a Massachusetts Supreme Court
ruled that an employer is permitted to terminate an employee for misconduct, even if such
conduct is a direct result of a visible or known disability. Id. Considering the wide judicial
divergence on this issue, employers are caught in a catch twenty-two situation, and
whether their well-intentioned action will be upheld depends on in which court their case
is litigated. Id.
160
See infra notes 161–69 and accompanying text (discussing the impact on non-disabled
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far superior qualifications than what the job requires, including a record
of high performance with the same employer, may be turned away from
a vacant job solely because a minimally qualified employee has a
disability and is unable to perform his current job as a result of that
disability.161 This approach illogically and unduly burdens non-disabled
employees who, for example, possess particular expertise that is not
required for the position but is beneficial to the employer or to the job
sought.162 Such an approach strips highly qualified, non-disabled
employees of opportunities that they have “every reason to expect[,]”
and could prevent them, for example, from moving into more
challenging jobs or to more desirable shifts, or from earning more
money, merely because another employee possesses a disability.163
Forcing an employer to disregard non-disabled employees’ records of
excellent work performance and prior work experience when making
hiring decisions leads to decreased job satisfaction for non-disabled
employees.164
individuals).
161
See supra note 96 (quoting the majority’s view in Midland Brake, noting that an
employer may be required to reassign a qualified, disabled employee who is unable to
perform his assigned job to a vacant position, unless doing so presents an undue burden,
and emphasizing that the disabled employee need not be the most-qualified for the vacant job).
162
See infra note 159 (showing how choosing less-qualified, but disabled, employees
places an undue burden on non-disabled employees).
163
See Brief Amici Curiae of the Equal Employment Advisory Council and the Employers
Group in Support of Petitioner, 18, US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391 (2002) (No. 001250). Requiring an employer to reject a more-qualified employee in favor of reassigning a
less-qualified, disabled employee unable to perform his assigned job, strips highly
qualified employees of opportunities that they have “every reason to expect.” Id. For
example, an employee may have previously worked as a sales person for a competitor in a
similar industry for fifteen years and, thus, possesses a keen knowledge of the employer’s
vacant sales position along with extensive contacts within the sales market. See id.
According to the Tenth Circuit, the employer must turn away the highly qualified
employee from the vacant sales job and instead hire the minimally qualified, disabled
employee unable to perform his assigned job. See id. This is true even when the disabled
employee has fewer years of experience, possesses none of the desired qualifications of the
job, and has a record of mediocre performance with the employer. See id. The Tenth
Circuit’s view could prevent highly qualified employees from moving to a more
challenging job, moving to a more desirable shift, or earning more money merely because
another employee possesses a disability. Id. See also Brief of Amicus Curiae Society for
Human Resources Management, 535 U.S. 391, at 3 (suggesting that the Tenth Circuit’s view
of reassignment unfairly gives brand new, minimally competent employees rights over
more-senior, more-competent employees). In the Tenth Circuit’s irrational view, the
minimally qualified, disabled employee unable to perform his assigned job would
apparently be entitled to the vacant job over the more-qualified employee, even if the
disabled employee was employed for less than one month, or even for only one day. Id. at
3, 5 n.4.
164
See Brief of Amicus Curiae Society for Human Resources Management, 535 U.S. 391, at
9 (noting that management decisions perceived by employees as unfair tend to produce
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Additionally, pursuant to the Tenth Circuit’s view that the ADA
entitles a qualified, disabled employee to be automatically reassigned to
a vacant position, candidates not already employed by an employer
must also be rejected, even when they possess extraordinarily impressive
credentials and are better-qualified for the vacant position than the
disabled employee.165 This result is inappropriate based on traditional
merit-based hiring practices, whereby highly qualified candidates have a
reason to expect a job over less-qualified candidates applying for the
same position.166 According to the Tenth Circuit’s position, non-disabled
individuals may be forced to remain unemployed or may be forced to
stay in a less-challenging job or on a less-desirable work shift and may be
forced to earn significantly less money merely because a person with a
disability is already employed by the company and is unable to perform
his existing job.167 This is true even when the disabled employee is
employed for only one day.168 Nonetheless, the Tenth Circuit requires an
unhealthy employee-management relations and can have devastating effects on workplace
morale for all employees, which can ultimately result in decreased productivity and
increased turnover).
165
See Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc. 180 F.3d 1154, 1164-75 (10th Cir. 1999) (en banc).
Based on the Tenth Circuit’s view, highly qualified external candidates who are
unemployed must remain unemployed instead of being selected for a position, merely
because a disabled person, already employed by the employer, is minimally qualified for the
job. See id. at 1164–69. See also Befort & Donesky, supra note 110, at 1089 (arguing that the
scale should tip in the disabled employee’s favor because he is less-qualified, and thus, less
likely than non-disabled applicants to gain employment elsewhere); Befort, supra note 11, at
983 (arguing the same); supra note 96 (discussing Midland Brake which concluded that
requiring a qualified, disabled employee unable to perform his assigned job to be the bestqualified for a vacant position is incongruent with the ADA).
166
Supra note 163. See also Huber v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 486 F.3d 480, 484 (8th Cir.
2007), cert. granted, 76 USLW 3200 (U.S. Dec. 7, 2007) (No. 07-480), cert. dismissed, 2008 WL
114946 (U.S. Jan 14, 2008) (NO. 07-480, R46-008). Wal-Mart rejected Huber even though she
was disabled, minimally qualified for the job, and unable to perform in her existing
position; indeed, the court correctly held that the employer did not violate the ADA by
hiring the most-qualified person for the job. Id. See also note 83 and accompanying text
(discussing the Seventh Circuit’s view that giving a disabled employee a position over a
more-qualified employee is unfounded and inappropriate).
167
See also O’Neil III & Reiss, supra note 148, at 359–60. According to the Tenth Circuit’s
opinion in Midland Brake, external candidates are either not considered or rejected, despite
possessing the precise, and perhaps unique, experience required for a particular vacant job.
Id. The authors argued that the ADA should not be construed to force an employer’s hand
into hiring a minimally qualified, disabled employee who is unable to perform his assigned
job over a more-qualified candidate. Id. It may be difficult for such a non-disabled person
to gain a similar job because of the uniqueness of the job sought and the lack of such
available positions in the relevant labor market. Id. The ADA should not be construed to
produce such an unreasonable result. Id.
168
See supra note 163 (discussing how a non-disabled employee may be unfairly
burdened by the Tenth Circuit’s approach of automatically reassigning a qualified,
disabled employee over a more-qualified candidate).
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employer to reject these candidates who have remarkable credentials, in
favor of reassigning a minimally qualified, disabled employee to a
vacant position.169 For all of these reasons, requiring an employer to
overlook superior candidates who demonstrate excellent qualifications
has unfortunate consequences for both employers and non-disabled
individuals.170
In summary, the Tenth Circuit’s approach to interpreting the ADA’s
reassignment provision misinterpreted the ADA and its legislative
history.171 Moreover, requiring automatic reassignment of a minimally
qualified, disabled employee to a vacant position, unless the employer
can show that such reassignment poses an undue hardship, is not only
ill-founded, but it is also impractical for employers and overly
burdensome on non-disabled individuals.172 For these reasons, the
Seventh and Eighth Circuits correctly interpreted the ADA by holding
that an employer is not required to breach its non-discriminatory policy
of hiring the most-qualified candidate in order to reassign a qualified,
disabled employee.173 Nonetheless, a circuit split will exist until the
Supreme Court clarifies an employer’s obligations relating to
reassignment.174
169
See Midland Brake, 180 F.3d at 1169 (stating that when a qualified, disabled employee
cannot perform his current job, he should be reassigned to a vacant position; he need not be
the most-qualified candidate for that vacant position); supra note 75 (discussing the EEOC’s
interpretation of the ADA’s reassignment provision—that an employer must reassign to a
vacant position a qualified, disabled employee unable to perform his assigned job without
considering whether a more-qualified individual is available). But see supra note 86
(referring to the type of approach that requires an employer to reassign a qualified,
disabled employee without regard to merit, as “affirmative action with a vengeance[]”).
170
See supra notes 148–69 and accompanying text (showing how interpreting the ADA as
mandating reassignment of a qualified, disabled employee to a vacant position over a
more-qualified candidate, as the Tenth Circuit does, negatively impacts employers and
non-disabled individuals).
171
See supra Part III.A (explaining how the Tenth Circuit’s view misinterprets the ADA);
supra Part III.B (explaining how the Tenth Circuit’s view misinterprets the legislative
history).
172
See supra Part III.C (discussing how the Tenth Circuit’s position on an employer’s
ADA-duty to reassign is impractical for employers and significantly burdens non-disabled
individuals).
173
See supra Part III (discussing why the Seventh and Eighth Circuit’s approach to
reassignment—that an employer is not required to waive its legitimate, non-discriminatory
policy of hiring the most-qualified candidate in order to reassign a qualified, disabled
employee—is superior to the Tenth Circuit’s approach).
174
Huber v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 486 F.3d 480 (8th Cir. 2007), cert. granted, 76 USLW
3200 (U.S. Dec. 7, 2007) (No. 07-480), cert. dismissed, 2008 WL 114946 (U.S. Jan 14, 2008) (NO.
07-480, R46-008); supra note 98 (noting that the circuit split will exist until the Court
resolves it, and predicting that the Court will have a chance to address this circuit split in
the near future); supra notes 74–75 (setting forth the cases establishing the circuit split
concerning whether an employer is required to reassign to a vacant position a qualified,
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IV. PROPOSED RULE AND JUDICIAL REASONING FOR CONCLUDING THAT THE
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT OF 1990 DOES NOT REQUIRE
REASSIGNMENT
The ADA requires an employer to provide reasonable
accommodation to a disabled individual so long as such accommodation
does not pose an undue hardship on business operations.175 An
individualized inquiry is required to determine whether an
accommodation is reasonable, or conversely, whether it presents an
undue hardship.176 Such a particularized assessment necessitates that in
some instances, reassigning a qualified, disabled employee to a vacant
position is reasonable accommodation.177 In other instances, however,
such as when a more-qualified candidate is available to fill a vacant
position, reassigning a disabled employee in violation of a qualificationbased hiring policy is not reasonable and poses an undue hardship.178
disabled employee unable to perform his assigned position when a more-qualified
individual could be available to fill the vacant job).
175
See supra notes 110–12 and accompanying text (explaining an employer’s duty to
provide reasonable accommodation); supra note 42 (quoting the ADA, particularly
§ 12112(b)(5)(A), located in the second paragraph, which states that an employer
discriminates against a disabled person under the ADA if it fails to provide reasonable
accommodation, unless such accommodation poses an undue hardship on the employer’s
operations).
176
See supra note 49 and accompanying text (noting that Sutton established that ADA
cases require individualized inquiries); supra note 45 (discussing Albertson’s, which called
for case-by-case determinations in ADA cases).
177
See supra note 134 (quoting the legislative record, in which Congress stated that
reasonable accommodation may include reassignment); supra notes 129–46 and
accompanying text (discussing that the ADA’s legislative history shows that reassignment
of a disabled individual can be a reasonable accommodation in certain circumstances);
supra notes 115–21 and accompanying text (explaining that the listed accommodations in
the ADA’s reasonable accommodation provision are possible accommodations).
178
See supra note 148 (noting that requiring an employer to forego its policy of hiring the
most-qualified candidate is unreasonable on its face); supra note 134 (quoting the legislative
record, in which Congress stated that reasonable accommodation may include a
reassignment to a vacant position, but not in every instance); supra note 131 (quoting the
legislative record, in which Congress stated that an employer is not required to prefer a
disabled applicant over non-disabled applicants for a vacant job); supra note 126 (noting
that reassignment is not always reasonable accommodation); supra notes 123–46 and
accompanying text (discussing that legislative history shows that reassignment of a
disabled individual can be a reasonable accommodation in certain circumstances, but is not
required); supra note 122 and accompanying text (quoting the majority in Midland Brake,
acknowledging that the listed accommodations in the Act’s reasonable accommodation
provision may not be reasonable in every circumstance); supra notes 105–21 (explaining
that the listed accommodations in the ADA’s reasonable accommodation provision are
possible accommodations, not requirements); supra notes 82–83, 86 (discussing HumistonKeeling—that the ADA does not require an employer to reassign to a vacant position a
disabled employee unable to perform his assigned job over a more-qualified, non-disabled
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Accordingly, this Part proposes the correct analysis for finding that
the ADA’s reassignment obligation does not require an employer to
waive its legitimate, non-discriminatory hiring policy in order to
accommodate a disabled employee who is unable to perform his
assigned job because of a qualifying disability.179 In keeping with stare
decisis, Part IV.A proposes that the Court should apply Barnett’s
rebuttable presumption rule when an employer refuses to reassign a
disabled employee because of its policy of hiring the most-qualified
candidate.180 Because the holding in Barnett was problematic, Part IV.B
examines why Barnett’s rule should be extended in cases involving such
a policy of hiring the best candidate.181
A. Barnett’s Rebuttable Presumption Rule: The Correct Approach to
Deciding Whether an Employer Is Required to Reassign a Qualified,
Disabled Employee to a Vacant Position over a More-Qualified Candidate
Barnett’s rebuttable presumption rule (dealing with an employer’s
seniority system) is appropriately applied to an employer’s policy of
hiring the best-qualified candidate for a position.182 Barnett’s rule, with
proposed language extending the rule to a merit-based hiring policy
noted in italics, is as follows:
[Reassignment of a qualified, disabled employee is
generally not “reasonable” when it] conflicts with [an
employer’s] legitimate, non-discriminatory, qualificationbased hiring policy, . . . [but] [t]he plaintiff remains free to
employee); supra notes 74, 77–85 (discussing the holding in Huber—that the ADA does not
require an employer to reassign to a vacant position a minimally qualified, disabled
employee unable to perform his assigned job over a more-qualified candidate); supra note
49 (stating that Sutton held that an individualized inquiry is imperative in ADA cases, and
noting, as an example, that one diabetic person may be disabled pursuant to the ADA,
while another diabetic fails to be covered by the ADA because he is not substantially
limited in his ability to perform a major life activity).
179
See infra Part IV.A (recommending a proposed rule and judicial reasoning for
concluding that the ADA does not require an employer to automatically reassign a
qualified, disabled employee over a more-qualified candidate).
180
See supra note 57 and accompanying text (quoting Barnett’s rebuttable presumption
rule); infra Part IV.A (proposing the appropriate rule and reasoning for determining that an
employer is not required to reassign a qualified, disabled employee over a more-qualified
candidate).
181
See infra notes 201–13 (discussing why Barnett dictates the proper result when a
proposed accommodation conflicts with a legitimate, non-discriminatory policy of hiring
the most-qualified candidate to fill a vacant position); infra Part IV.B (discussing why the
rule is appropriate, even though a similar rule was unsuccessful in Barnett).
182
See supra text accompanying note 57 (stating the rebuttable presumption rule
announced in Barnett).
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present evidence of special circumstances that
make . . . a[n] . . . exception [to the policy “reasonable”]
in the particular case. And such a showing will defeat
the employer's demand for summary judgment.183
Where an employer would have to waive its hiring policy in order to
reassign a disabled employee, Barnett’s rule upholds the hiring policy, as
long as the policy is legitimate and non-discriminatory, but Barnett’s rule
also allows an employee to demonstrate that the situation warranted an
exception to the hiring policy.184
Merit-based hiring policies are similar to seniority policies because
both create expectations for employees concerning how vacant positions
will be filled.185 There is an even stronger reason for upholding merit-

183
US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 394 (2002); see supra note 57 and
accompanying text (stating the rebuttable presumption rule announced in Barnett); supra
Part III.A–B (discussing how an approach that gives way to preferring disabled individuals
at the expense of non-disabled individuals exceeds the statutory requirements and
Congress’s intent). See also Long, supra note 152, at 905–11. One commentator, Long,
proposed a similar approach, making reassignment to a vacant position of a qualified,
disabled employee unreasonable whenever it resulted in violating the contractual rights of
another employee or otherwise resulted in adverse employment action for another
employee. Id. That approach is commendable and addresses a reassignment conflict in
which the interest of a non-disabled employee is at stake. Id. However, that solution stops
short of addressing a conflict involving a minimally qualified, disabled employee and an
individual not currently employed by the employer. Id. For example, using Long’s
approach, in the hypothetical scenario presented in Part I, the non-disabled candidate
possessing well-beyond the required qualifications of the vacant job at issue, would not be
selected. Id. Rather, the disabled, but significantly less-qualified, employee would be
selected. Id. Moreover, the same result would also occur if the external candidate
possessed an ADA-covered disability. Id. In such a case, as where two disabled people
apply for a job, the employer would be required to choose the significantly less qualified
employee merely because the less-qualified candidate was already employed, even though
both were disabled. Id. That would be true, even where the less-qualified candidate was
employed for only one month. Id. Thus, while the author’s proposed solution provides a
good foundation for addressing a conflict involving a disabled and a non-disabled
employee competing for a vacant job, a more comprehensive solution is needed to address
the broader range of possible hiring scenarios, which often involve external candidates. Id.
Also, although Long was apparently attempting to strike a balance of the competing
interests, his approach goes beyond the requirements set forth in the ADA and
congressional intent.
184
See supra note 57 and accompanying text (describing how Barnett’s rebuttable
presumption rule is applied).
185
See supra notes 61–62 (indicating that the Barnett Court discussed the benefits of
seniority systems in fostering employee expectations of fair treatment); supra notes 61, 66
(noting that Justice Scalia compared seniority polices to other employment policies and
noted that important benefits stem from other policies); supra note 163 and accompanying
text (explaining that hiring policies create expectations concerning how vacant jobs will be
filled).
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based policies, though, because hiring the best candidate for open
positions positively impacts both short-term and long-term profit
margins as well as the overall functioning of a business.186 Accordingly,
requiring an employer to waive such policies not only negatively affects
non-disabled individuals (much like requiring an employer to waive a
seniority policy does), but it negatively impacts business operations;
thus, such reassignment is not only unreasonable (like requiring an
employer to waive a seniority policy is), it creates an undue hardship.187
Barnett’s rebuttable presumption rule, therefore, should be applied when
reassignment of a disabled employee conflicts with a merit-based hiring
policy.188 Such a policy will nearly always be upheld as long as it is
legitimate and not discriminatory.189
Barnett’s rebuttable presumption rule for reassigning a qualified,
disabled employee properly addresses the following considerations: (1)
the ADA’s requirements; (2) pertinent legislative history; and (3) the
burden on employers and on non-disabled individuals.190 First, Barnett’s
rebuttable presumption, which proposes to uphold a legitimate, nondiscriminatory policy of hiring the most-qualified candidate for a vacant
position, is in line with the ADA’s requirements.191 The ADA focuses on
eliminating discrimination against people with disabilities and says
nothing about providing preference to disabled employees over nondisabled individuals.192 Thus, Barnett’s rebuttable presumption favoring
186
See Long, supra note 152, at 903 (noting that requiring an employer to forego its policy
of hiring the best-qualified individual for a given position places more burden on an
employer than requiring the same employer to forego its seniority policy because a
seniority policy does not ensure that the most-qualified candidate will be hired for a
position, only that the person who has the most seniority will be hired); supra note 151
(describing the business consequences that flow from following qualification-based hiring
policies).
187
See supra note 42 (defining “reasonable accommodation” and “undue hardship”);
supra note 151 (discussing the business advantages of following qualification-based hiring
policies).
188
See also supra note 42 (defining the terms “reasonable accommodation” and “undue
hardship”).
189
See text accompanying note 183 (stating the proposed rebuttable presumption rule for
addressing a situation where reassignment of a qualified, disabled employee conflicts with
a merit-based hiring policy).
190
See also supra Part III (discussing three important considerations for determining
whether the ADA requires an employer to ignore its merit-based hiring policy and give
way to hiring the disabled, but less-qualified, employee).
191
See supra Part III.A (describing the ADA’s requirements, and explaining why
requiring an employer to reassign a qualified, disabled employee to a vacant position
exceeds the ADA’s requirements).
192
See supra text accompanying note 109; supra Part III.A (discussing that the ADA’s
purpose is to eliminate discrimination and that it makes no references to providing
disabled people with advantages over non-disabled people, and showing that the ADA
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a legitimate, non-discriminatory hiring policy meets the ADA’s
requirements.193
Second, Barnett’s rebuttable presumption rule appropriately
considers legislative history.194 Congress did not intend to debilitate
employers by mandating that they maintain a minimally qualified
workforce.195 Instead, congressional intent supports the practice of
filling a vacant position without considering a person’s disability or the
reasonable accommodation that a person requires because of a
disability.196 Therefore, deferring to an employer’s qualification-based
hiring policy is consistent with congressional intent.197
Third, and perhaps most importantly, Barnett’s rebuttable
presumption rule favoring an employer’s legitimate, non-discriminatory
hiring policy of selecting the most-qualified candidate, adequately
addresses competing policy concerns.198 As long as an employer’s policy
is justifiable and non-discriminatory, it will typically be upheld, but still,
a disabled plaintiff remains free to present special circumstances that
lists reassignment to a vacant position as a possible reasonable accommodation); supra notes
74, 83, 85–86 (discussing cases, such as Huber, Humiston-Keeling, Burns, Dalton, Terrell,
Daugherty, Kellogg, Cravens, and Turco, that have concluded that the ADA’s purpose is to
deter discrimination, not promote affirmative action); see also supra note 40 (quoting the
ADA’s purpose statement, which expressly indicates its intent to eliminate discrimination
against people with disabilities); supra notes 23, 32 (noting the President’s statements
concerning the ADA’s purpose).
193
See supra Part III.A (discussing the ADA’s requirements in support of this position).
194
See supra note Part III.B (quoting the ADA’s legislative history, and justifying why
requiring an employer to reassign a qualified, disabled employee unable to perform his
assigned job to a vacant position goes well beyond what Congress intended the ADA to
require).
195
See supra note Part III.B (quoting the ADA’s legislative history, and explaining why
requiring an employer to reassign a qualified, disabled employee unable to perform his
assigned job to a vacant position goes beyond congressional intent); supra text
accompanying note 146 (indicating in the first sentence of the quoted text that Congress
reaffirmed that the ADA does not force employers to hire minimally qualified, disabled
workers); supra note 131 (same)). See also O’Neil III & Reiss, supra note 148, at 365 (“[A]n
employer’s obligation to reassign a disabled employee should not shackle the fundamental
right [of employers] to select the most-qualified individual for a vacant position.”).
196
See supra note 134 (quoting the legislative record, and noting that Congress intended
for reassignment to be considered, not required); supra note 131 and accompanying text
(quoting the legislative record, and in particular, the last two sentences in which Congress
expressly stated that an employer should make hiring decisions without considering whether
an applicant has a disability); supra notes 123–46 and accompanying text (discussion).
197
See supra Part III.B (discussing the ADA’s history, and arguing that requiring an
employer to reassign a qualified, disabled employee to a vacant position over a morequalified candidate goes against congressional intent).
198
See supra Part III.C (indicating competing policy concerns involved, and explaining
why requiring an employer to reassign to a vacant position a qualified, disabled employee
who is unable to perform his assigned job over more-qualified, non-disabled individuals,
fails to strike an appropriate balance of these concerns).
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warrant an exception.199 This approach—a rebuttable presumption rule
that upholds a legitimate, non-discriminatory policy of hiring the mostqualified candidate for a vacant position—appropriately balances the
business needs of employers and the interests of disabled and nondisabled individuals.200
B. If the Rebuttable Presumption Rule Failed in Barnett in 2002, Why Should
the Court Apply It in the Future? Different Court, Different Facts,
Different Era.
If Barnett’s ruling was problematic in 2002, why should the Court
apply Barnett’s rebuttable presumption rule in the future?201 First, the
primary shortcoming of Barnett was that the Court did not indicate
whether it was limited to seniority policies; and, so, litigants raced to the
courthouses to test the holding.202 The likely reason, of course, that the
Barnett Court did not deliver a broad holding is that the members of the
Court could not agree on anything more expansive than what Barnett
actually held.203 In addition, the Court is supposed to avoid rendering
an advisory opinion, and minimalism has been espoused by most
justices.204 A ruling, therefore, that applied beyond seniority policies
would have been inappropriate, as it would have exceeded the scope of
the precise issue presented.205 Therefore, the Court delivered its
ambiguous holding, agreeing to as much as it could, issuing five distinct
199
See Greenwald, supra note 98, at 1 (reviewing comments of various attorneys
regarding how the ADA’s reassignment duty should be interpreted, and noting that one
attorney stated that requiring affirmative action would be dangerous because it goes
against making a decision based on merit, and thus, violates an important cornerstone of
good hiring practices); supra note 98 (quoting Hyman, explaining that when an employer
makes a hiring decision on grounds other than merit, it opens itself up to lawsuits from
non-selected candidates).
200
See supra Part III.C (describing the policy concerns, and demonstrating why requiring
an employer to reassign a qualified, disabled employee unable to perform his assigned job
to a vacant position over a more-qualified candidate does not appropriately balance these
concerns).
201
See infra notes 202–13 and accompanying text (discussing why the Court should apply
Barnett’s rebuttable presumption rule to an employer’s legitimate, non-discriminatory
policy of hiring the best-qualified candidate).
202
See supra notes 59, 61, 66 (discussing the ambiguity of Barnett and the uncertainty it
left in its wake); supra notes 67–68 and accompanying text (discussing cases in which
plaintiffs tested Barnett’s limits).
203
See supra note 61 (indicating, in the second full paragraph of the quoted text, that
Justice O’Connor acknowledged that if she had not voted with the majority, the Court may
not have delivered a majority opinion).
204
See supra note 48 (explaining that courts must refrain from delivering advisory
opinions).
205
See supra note 48 (noting that the Court must avoid rendering opinions that exceed the
issues presented).

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol43/iss1/5

Flores: A Disability is Not a Trump Card: The Americans with Disabilities

2008]

The ADA Does Not Require Reassignment

257

opinions; the Court’s opinion was vague and complex, and that is largely
why it was so problematic.206 However, with new members on the Court
and facts implicating a merit-based hiring policy as opposed to the
seniority policy in Barnett, the Court can agree to apply the feasible
rebuttable presumption rule.207 In light of the litigation triggered by
Barnett, the Court may be well-convinced that a more precise holding
concerning an employer’s reassignment obligation is not only warranted
but also necessary.208
The other major criticism of Barnett is the unmanageability of the
“special circumstances” exception.209 However, it is well-established that
disability discrimination is different than other types of discrimination,
requires different protections, and most significantly, requires a different
and individualized analysis.210 Although this is not wholly comforting to
most employers who would favor a per se rule upholding employers’
merit-based hiring policies, the unique nature of disability
discrimination makes a per se rule inappropriate and unworkable.211
Such a rule would potentially prevent disabled plaintiffs from
challenging the legitimacy of particular hiring policies or the manner in
206
See supra note 61 (noting the issues on which the members of the Court had difficulty
reaching agreement, and discussing each of the five opinions in Barnett); supra note 59
(quoting Judge Trott).
207
See supra note 98 and accompanying text (noting that, before the Court dismissed
Huber, management employment lawyers predicted that the Court would rule in WalMart’s favor and that the Court would have a relatively easy time reaching consensus, in
part because Justice Breyer recused himself from the case). See also, e.g., supra notes 78–81
and accompanying text. Based on the record in Huber, which directly involved an
employer’s merit-based hiring policy, the current Court would have been able to apply
Barnett’s rebuttable presumption rule. Supra notes 78–81 and accompanying text. Huber
conceded that the candidate selected for the vacant position that Huber sought was morequalified than Huber. Supra notes 78–81 and accompanying text. Furthermore, Huber did
not contend that Wal-Mart’s hiring policy was illegitimate or discriminatory. Supra notes
78–81. Instead, Huber argued that Wal-Mart should have made an exception to its
established policy because of Huber’s disability. Supra notes 78–81 and accompanying text.
Thus, applying Barnett’s rebuttable presumption rule would have allowed the Court to
uphold Wal-Mart’s policy. Supra notes 78–81 and accompanying text.
208
See supra notes 67–68 and accompanying text (discussing several lawsuits filed after
Barnett).
209
See supra note 59 (discussing the problems with Barnett’s “special circumstances”
language); supra note 67 (listing cases brought after Barnett, which attempted to clarify
when a plaintiff shows “special circumstances”).
210
See supra notes 45, 49 (noting that ADA cases call for individualized inquiries); supra
notes 110–12 (discussing the unique nature of disability discrimination compared to other
types of discrimination).
211
See John F. Scalia & David A. Kessler, U.S. Supreme Court Rules That Employers Do Not
Have To Disturb Seniority Systems To Accommodate Disabled Employees Absent Proof Of Special
Circumstances (May 2002), http://www.gtlaw.com/pub/Alerts/2002/scaliaj_05.asp
(arguing that a bright-line rule would be beneficial for employers).
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which policies are implemented.212 Barnett’s rebuttable presumption rule
strikes the necessary balance by recognizing that mandatory
reassignment of a qualified, disabled employee over a better-qualified
candidate is unreasonable and presents an undue hardship, but not
restricting entirely a disabled person’s ability to challenge policies that
are illegitimate or improperly executed.213 In keeping with the notion of
stare decisis, the Court should apply Barnett’s rebuttable presumption
rule when an employer refuses to reassign a disabled employee because
of its legitimate and non-discriminatory policy of hiring the best
candidate.214
V. CONCLUSION
Since the ADA’s passage in 1990, the Act has spawned much judicial
debate. From its infancy to the present, difficulties in addressing basic
questions, such as whether a particular condition is a disability or
whether the ADA requires an employer to reassign a disabled worker,
have troubled employers and their legal counsel greatly. Not all of the
blame for this uncertainty should be directed toward Congress for
writing the statute vaguely. Part of the problem with resolving these
rudimentary questions stems from the uniqueness of disability issues
and the need for individualized review. Consequently, employers have
looked not only to the ADA and its history to guide their decision
making, but also to case law. However, this practice has not been
without obstacles because it has left employers trying to piece together
parts of judicial opinions from cases with similar, but slightly different,
facts. Speculating as to how a court may rule on a set of facts has been
mere guesswork. More predictability, particularly regarding when an
employer’s reassignment duty conflicts with its policy of hiring the best
applicant, is sorely needed.
The judicial reasoning proposed in Part IV.A provides a method for
the Court to resolve the circuit split and to determine that the ADA does
not require an employer to waive its legitimate, non-discriminatory,
merit-based hiring policy in favor of reassigning a qualified, disabled
employee to a vacant position. When an employer is forced to violate its
hiring policy in order to reassign a qualified, disabled employee, the
Court should apply Barnett’s rebuttable presumption rule, which will
nearly always result in upholding the policy. Although the rule allows a
See Long, supra note 152, at 893–94 (describing problems with a bright-line rule
favoring hiring policies).
213
Id. (explaining that balancing the interests of all parties involved in the reassignment
of a qualified, disabled employee is important).
214
See supra notes 201–13.
212
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plaintiff to present special circumstances that warrant an exception to the
policy, such circumstances do not exist where the plaintiff concedes that
the policy was legitimate and non-discriminatory, and that the chosen
candidate was more-qualified than the plaintiff.
In applying Barnett’s rebuttable presumption to the hypothetical
scenario presented in Part I, involving a disabled employee and a nondisabled external applicant, the employer would not be forced to hire the
disabled, but less-qualified, employee, so long as it selected the morequalified candidate pursuant to a legitimate, non-discriminatory, meritbased hiring policy. The ADA is aimed at providing equality of
opportunity—not at providing special advantages or giving preference
to disabled individuals over non-disabled individuals. Thus, Barnett’s
rebuttable presumption—favoring a legitimate, non-discriminatory
qualification-based hiring policy while, allowing a disabled employee to
present evidence that special circumstances warrant an exception to the
policy—appropriately balances the business needs of employers and the
interests of both disabled and non-disabled individuals.
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